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1.1. Organizational experience and valuable corporate expansions  
 
Perhaps the most important trends in the economic environment over the past few decades are 
the rapid technological progress, the opening up and liberalization of new potent markets 
(such as China or former socialist countries), and the increasing globalization (Barkema, 
Baum, & Mannix, 2002; Bettis & Hitt, 1995; Hitt, Keats, & De Marie, 1998). A product of 
these trends is what has been termed the ‘new competitive landscape’ (Bettis & Hitt, 1995; 
Hitt et al., 1998), where corporate decision-makers are confronted with major strategic 
challenges due to uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity of their tasks across various 
environments. Companies respond to these new pressures in a variety of ways, among which 
the use of cooperative strategies (cf. Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Gomes-Casseres, 2003; 
Steensma & Lyles, 2000), exploitation of global markets (cf. Hennart, 2000; Lu & Beamish, 
2004; Mitchell, Shaver, & Yeung, 1992, 1993), and changes in product scope (cf. Bettis & 
Prahalad, 1995; Delios & Beamish, 1999; Markides & Williamson, 1996) are some of the 
most prominent.  
Above all, successful use of such strategies and long-term survival of firms in the 
highly competitive and globalizing world make it imperative that firms possess appropriate 
skills and knowledge. While learning from experience is one of the key ways of building such 
valuable repositories of routines and knowledge (cf. Cyert & March, 1963; Levitt & March, 
1988; Hitt et al., 1998; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Penrose, 1995), our 
understanding of what firms may in fact learn from different types of experiences and what 
helps them to successfully apply some of this knowledge in a variety of investment situations 
(cf. Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999) is limited. It is only intuitive to expect that firms that are 
successful when operating in one type of environment – such as a specific industry, country, 
culture, etc. – may be unsuccessful using the same strategy and routines in another type of 
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environment. As globalization and technological progress make environmental change more 
of a rule than an exception, it is interesting to ask which strategies and routines help firms to 
succeed in this changing world. 
In an attempt to enhance our understanding of these issues, in this thesis we take the 
perspective of shareholders to investigate which strategic moves and what types of experience 
help firms to enhance their value across a variety of environments. The key but not sole 
theoretical perspective relied on is the organizational learning theory (cf. Argyres & Schon, 
1978; Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Cyert & March, 1963; Fiol & 
Lyles, 1985; Levitt & March, 1988; March, 1991; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). Through 
these lenses, we first investigate how firms explore foreign markets (Chapter 2). Our 
departure point is the observation that when expanding into new and uncertain environments, 
successful companies often choose for strategic alliances, as these investment vehicles are 
particularly suitable for projects that have uncertain outcomes (cf. Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997, 
1998; Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Mjoen & Tallman, 1997; Mody, 1993; Steensma & Lyles, 
2000). Building on this idea, in Chapter 2 we develop theory and hypotheses in order to 
determine under which conditions two qualitatively and quantitatively distinct types of 
strategic alliances – majority- and minority-owned international joint ventures (IJVs) – are 
chosen and create most value for internationalizing firms.  
Chapter 2 establishes that minority IJVs are particularly attractive means of exploring 
foreign markets under conditions of uncertainty, which may result from political factors and 
cultural differences. Conversely, majority IJVs are a preferred investment vehicle when 
uncertainty is low, for example thanks to past experience firms may have with a given culture. 
Another key finding of this study is that organizational experience with establishing and 




even lead to negative firm value consequences, suggesting the need to further investigate the 
role of organizational experience in corporate expansion.  
Indeed, the observed selective rather than universal applicability of various elements 
of organizational experience across diverse investment situations implies that its relationship 
with firm performance is more complex than it has been assumed previously in the 
International Business literature (e.g., Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Eriksson, Johanson, 
Majkgård, & Sharma; 2000; Li, 1995). Hence, in Chapter 3 we delve into the issue of the 
content of international experience of firms (cf. Levitt & March, 1988), and develop theory 
and hypotheses in order to determine how two distinct types of international experience – its 
depth and breadth – influence firm value creation upon expansions abroad (cf. Luo & Peng, 
1999). A key notion in this study is that past experiences and the resulting organizational 
routines may be inadequate relative to what would be needed for firms to successfully enter a 
given market (cf. Levitt & March, 1988, Nelson & Winter, 1982), which may possibly lead to 
misapplication of this experience and negative performance outcomes (Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999). We propose that the diversity of organizational experience secures against 
such a possibility. We also note that the political, cultural, and macroeconomic context in 
which experience has been accumulated and to which it is possibly reapplied matters for firm 
capabilities to generate value with new foreign ventures (cf. Delios & Henisz, 2003).  
In Chapter 4 we extend the analyses of the content and the adequacy of organizational 
experience to the context of corporate expansion within and across industries. Unlike the 
majority of prior studies in this particularly rich area of investigation (cf. Montgomery, 1994; 
Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 2000), we propose a dynamic view on what kinds of steps firms 
may take on their diversification routes and which types of experiences help them to create 
most value when doing so. We explore the idea that past experiences from a given industry as 
well as from a broad range of industries are valuable, in particular when in combination with 
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one another. We also hypothesize that corporate expansions of an exploitative character – 
such as greenfield investments or entries into industries closely related to core activities of 
firms – are relatively more valuable with increasing within-industry experience. Conversely, 
experiences from a range of industries are particularly valuable for firms undertaking 
investments of a rather exploratory character, such as entries into unrelated industries or 
acquisitions. 
Overall, the three studies show the importance of organizational experience for the 
ability of corporate leadership to create firm value, as perceived by capital providers, analysts, 
media, etc. The findings corroborate the key notion of this thesis: that it is important to 
consider both the quality and the content of organizational experience, rather than its quantity 
alone, when analyzing which strategies and under what conditions should be used by 
companies in their quest to become successful global players.  
 
 
1.2. Notes on research design 
 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 combine theory development with empirical testing. Building on prior 
research, each of these chapters proposes novel theory and hypotheses on what makes 
corporate expansions valuable, or, technically speaking, how formations of new ventures 
impact shareholder wealth. Subsequently, hypotheses are tested empirically using state-of-
the-art econometric methods, as explained in the chapters. As each of these studies constitutes 
an independent paper, significant overlaps in data and method descriptions will be 
encountered throughout. 
The theoretical predictions derived in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are tested on samples of 




1973-1998 (Chapters 2 and 4) and 1982-1998 (Chapter 3).1 The samples are based on 
information provided in annual reports of these firms, press releases in the Dutch financial 
daily, Het Financieele Dagblad, and Amsterdam Stock Exchange data sourced from 
Datastream Advance database of ThomsonTM Financial. Further details are provided in 
sections 2.6, 3.5, and 4.5. 
Consistent with the theory presented in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, the core dependent 
variable used to test the hypotheses is firm value created with a new expansion. In the spirit of 
capital market efficiency hypothesis (Fama, 1976), it is assumed that Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange is a semi-strongly efficient market, i.e., that changes in share prices around public 
announcements of corporate expansions provide unbiased assessments of their economic 
consequences from the perspective of the company’s shareholders. Hence, abnormal changes 
in stock prices upon such announcements are measured and used as a proxy for firm value 
creation. The same procedure is used to estimate firm value created with IJVs (Chapter 2), 
new international ventures (Chapter 3), and expansions within and across industries (Chapter 
4). Additionally, in Chapter 2 we propose a novel approach to validating the event study 
method, where analyses of abnormal returns are combined with analyses of managerial 
choices and their impact on firm profitability over extended periods of time. Further details 
are provided in sections 2.6.2 and 2.7.2.  
We now proceed with the three studies of valuable corporate expansions, conditional 
on firm-specific and contextual factors. Each of the papers is concluded with a discussion of 
implications and suggestions for future research. Chapter 5 summarizes the main findings of 
the thesis and further reiterates its limitations and potential extensions. 
 
 
                                                 
1 The sample period used in Chapter 3 is shorter than the one used in either Chapter 2 or 4 due to 






Exploring foreign markets through minority and majority 
international joint ventures 
 
 
2.1. Abstract  
 
This paper develops theory and hypotheses regarding how internationalizing companies use 
minority and majority IJVs to explore foreign settings and build a successful multinational 
corporation (MNC). We discuss how the choice of minority versus majority IJVs depends on 
political and culture risk, and on experience in cultural blocks and with the particular 
investment mode. The theoretical predictions are tested on data on 200 IJVs of 25 Dutch 
companies between 1973 and 1998. We examine both the expansion mode choice (majority 
versus minority IJVs, using logit models) as well as its implications for firm value (using 
event study methodology and regression techniques) and profitability (using panel data 
analysis methods).  
                                                 






Over the past two decades, the opening up of markets around the globe and the increasing 
pace of technological innovation has thrown companies in many industries into a race to reap 
opportunities and invest beyond their national borders (Barkema et al., 2002; Doz, Santos, & 
Williamson, 2001; Hitt et al., 1998). Over this period, the stock of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) increased more than tenfold, to USD 7,100 billion (between 1980 and 2002, UNCTAD, 
2003), and reached the level of USD 612 billion in 2004, a rise of 9% compared to 2003 
(UNCTAD, 2005). However, companies are internationalizing in a politically uncertain and 
culturally fragmented world,3 and many of their foreign investments fail (cf. Delios & 
Beamish, 2001; Li, 1995; Mitchell et al., 1992, 1993). So far, even out of the Fortune 500 
companies, only 2.4% have become truly global (Rugman & Verbeke, 2004). This 
underscores the idea that investing in foreign countries is inherently hazardous.  
Both management theory and evidence show that when expanding into new and 
uncertain environments, successful companies engage in exploration first, unlike less 
successful firms (cf. Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; March, 1991). 
Exploratory investments have been examined in the context of developing new technology 
(Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997, 1998; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001), new products (Katila & 
Ahuja, 2002; Holmqvist, 2004; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), and new establishments (Baum, 
Li, & Usher, 2000; Winter & Szulanski, 2001). Exploration is particularly important if 
companies are involved in a competitive race (Grenadier, 2002; March, 1991), for instance, 
when they vie with others in their industry to become a successful global company. One way 
in which firms can explore dynamic competitive landscapes is through strategic alliances, as 
these investment vehicles are particularly suited for projects that have uncertain outcomes 
                                                 
3 For instance, 42% of world FDI in 2004 was in developing countries (UNCTAD, 2005). 
Minority and majority IJVs 
 9
(Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanth, 2002; 
Kogut, 1991; Makhija & Ganesh, 1997; Mjoen & Tallman, 1997; Mody, 1993; Steensma & 
Lyles, 2000). In this study, we contributed to this area of knowledge by investigating how 
internationalizing companies use (and learn from) their FDI – in particular, minority and 
majority IJVs – to explore foreign settings and build a successful MNC.  
Prior work in the area of joint ventures suggests that there is a variety of cooperative 
forms firms may choose among when attempting exploration of a new market, where different 
forms are suitable in different situations (Choi & Beamish, 2004; Geringer & Hebert, 1989; 
Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002; Kumar & Seth, 1998; Mjoen & Tallman, 1997; Pan, 1996, 
2002; Parkhe, 1993). Different types of joint ventures also differ in their performance 
outcomes (Choi & Beamish, 2004; Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004; Geringer & Hebert, 1989; 
Makhija & Ganesh, 1997; Mjoen & Tallman, 1997). The distinction between minority and 
majority IJVs is particularly interesting (cf. Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Hennart, 1991; 
Pennings, Barkema, & Douma, 1994), for two reasons. First, these two types differ in 
quantitative terms, where smaller stakes imply lower commitment of resources and less 
control as compared to larger stakes (Child, Yan, & Lu, 1997; Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004; 
Kogut, 1991; Mjoen & Tallman, 1997). Second, holding a dominant or a subordinate position 
in an IJV may require different skills and interorganizational routines from participating firms 
(cf. Anand & Khanna, 2000; Kale, Dyer, & Singh; 2002; Pennings et al., 1994; Simonin, 
1997; Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002), while also implying different rights (Child et al., 1997).4 
Yet, it remains unclear how internationalizing firms use minority and majority IJVs as 
exploratory mechanisms, and how they perform as a consequence. 
In order to address this question, we build on organizational learning research to 
develop theory and hypotheses regarding how firms use these exploratory investment modes 
                                                 
4 For example, majority share in most countries conveys the right to set an IJV’s policy (Child, 2002).  
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to build a successful company (in terms of firm value and profitability) in the face of political 
hazards (Henisz & Delios, 2001) and cultural risk (Barkema et al., 1996). Our (dynamic) 
theory further examines how the experience with cultural and political settings in ‘cultural 
blocks’ (for instance, South East Asia, Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe; cf. 
Barkema et al., 1996; Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Park & Ungson, 1997; Ronen & Shenkar, 
1985) and the experience with the investment vehicles themselves (i.e., minority and majority 
IJVs), influence the subsequent use of these investments modes and firm value creation as a 
consequence. We argue that companies may not only learn about foreign settings and about 
establishing and running the investment vehicle itself, but also that they their experiences in 
one role (for instance, that of a minority partner) may be inapplicable, and hence useless, in 
the other role (for instance, that of a majority partner). 
We tested our hypotheses using data on 200 IJVs of 25 Dutch companies during the 
period of 1973-1998, when these companies were internationalizing intensively. Consistent 
with the hypotheses, we examined both the expansion mode choice (majority versus minority 
IJVs, using logit models) and its implications for firm value (using event study methodology 
and regression techniques). Event study methodology has generally been accepted in strategic 
management research (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997; Park, 2004). However, recent research 
(Westphal & Zajac, 1998) and practice (e.g., volatile stock markets, the bursting of the 
dot-com bubble) suggest that investors may imperfectly understand the long-term 
implications of strategic decisions for firm value. Hence, as a further check on the validity of 
the empirical tests, we examined whether the strategic choices implied by our theory 
enhanced firm profitability. We found that companies actively using majority and minority 
IJVs in ways predicted by our theory had considerably higher profitability over the window of 
analysis (26 years) compared to companies whose strategies were not in accordance with the 
theoretical predictions. This corroborated the key notion of our paper: that (examining) the 
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choice of minority versus majority IJVs is important both from a research perspective and 
from a strategic point of view. 
 
 
2.3. Background  
 
Investing beyond national borders is an inherently risky affair (Mitchell et al., 1992, 1993). 
When investing in their home countries, companies basically exploit their existing 
knowledge: of local suppliers, customers, about the local culture, etc. Hence, domestic 
investment implies relatively little uncertainty for firms. However, companies may also 
search for new investments opportunities beyond their national borders: to realize economies 
of scope and scale (Kim, Hwang, & Burgers, 1989, 1993), to lower manufacturing costs 
(Vernon, 1966), to tap into new knowledge of markets and technologies (Doz et al., 2001; 
Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998), or to play ‘global chess’ (Hout, Porter, & Rudden, 1982). 
Such planned variation and experimentation in new environments implies – at least initially – 
much uncertainty and risk for the company’s foreign investments (March, 1991).  
 Prior literature has emphasized that firms may reduce such risk by engaging in 
cooperation with local partners and taking a partial stake in the venture (Bowman & Hurry, 
1993; Folta & Miller, 2002; Kogut, 1991; Lu & Beamish, 2001; Mjoen & Tallman, 1997; 
Reuer & Leiblein, 2000). In this case, companies supply only a portion of the assets and are 
confronted with only part of the profits or losses from the investment, which minimizes their 
risk (Bowman & Hurry, 1993; Kogut, 1991). Moreover, IJVs allow firms to gain new 
knowledge, quickly enter new markets, and obtain complementary resources, all of which is 
needed to develop competitive advantage (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Khanna, Gulati, & 
Nohria, 1998; Lyles, 1988; Mody 1993), in particular in uncertain and competitive 
Chapter 2 
 12
environments (Brown & Eisenhard, 1997; Chi & McGuire, 1996; Folta & Miller, 2002; 
Grenadier, 2002; Kogut, 1991; Mitchell & Singh, 1992). However, such investments do not 
reduce risk entirely. In fact, the value a firm is able to realize from resources invested abroad 
remains subject to local economic and political conditions, the actions of local suppliers, 
customers, competitors, etc. Moreover, at least initially, the firm faces uncertainty due to lack 
of knowledge of the host country’s culture, language, trade practices, etc. (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977; Zaheer, 1995). This makes it more difficult for the firm to deal with local 
parties, most importantly with the partner in the IJV. Indeed, cultural differences within the 
IJV may lead to conflict and misunderstanding, thereby increasing the likelihood that the IJV 
fails (Li, 1995; Barkema et al., 1996). 
 In addition to these challenges, the internationalizing company also needs to learn how 
to operate the investment vehicle itself (Barkema, Shenkar, Vermeulen, & Bell, 1997). More 
specifically, our study distinguishes between minority and majority IJVs. In minority IJVs, 
foreign investors tend to leave the managing of the IJV (in terms of selection of local 
suppliers, contacts with key customers, hiring, etc.) to local partners. Exercising 
disproportionate control over a minority-owned venture (as compared to equity stake), if 
possible, may require the minority partner to engage in subtle, often informal, governance 
arrangements and diplomacy (Schaan, 1988). Conversely, in majority IJVs, foreign parents, 
having made greater upfront investment in creation of their IJVs and facing higher exit costs 
than in minority IJVs, tend to have larger bargaining power and more influence on the 
ventures (cf. Child, 2002; Child et al., 1997; Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004; Mjoen & Tallman, 
1997). In what follows, we will argue that these are two different roles that internationalizing 
firms need to learn, where misunderstanding between partners, role conflicts, etc., may lead to 
the failure of the IJV as well. In sum, both in the case of differences in national cultures and 
in the case of different roles, misunderstanding and conflicts may occur, especially – as we 
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will argue below – if companies have little international experience, rendering IJVs a 
particularly risky affair.  
 
 
2.4. Theory  
 
We define the company’s knowledge base as its rules, procedures, conventions, and strategies 
regarding how to operate abroad, as well as the underlying structure of knowledge and beliefs 
(cf. Greenwood & Hinings, 1993). We define organizational learning as expanding the 
company’s knowledge base, which includes their routines (Levitt & March, 1988; Zollo & 
Winter, 2002) and knowledge and belief structures (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Walsh, 1995) 
regarding, in the present context, foreign national cultures and investment vehicles (i.e., 
minority and majority IJVs). A lack of knowledge in these domains, combined with a lack of 
‘specific knowledge’ of the particular time and place (Hayek, 1945): of local suppliers, 
customers, competitors, etc., implies relatively high levels of uncertainty and risk regarding 
locally invested assets and the associated revenues and profits. This suggests that companies 
should invest in relatively small portions of local investment projects, while leaving the local 
management to the local partner.  
 Indeed, prior research showed that successful companies ‘probe’ new environments, 
where venturing is risky and its outcomes uncertain, using relatively small investments of 
physical and managerial resources (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997, 1998). Such investments 
allow firms to test and establish toeholds in the new areas of business, building valuable 
(knowledge) platforms for future expansion while limiting downside risk (Kogut & 
Kulatilaka, 1994; Mody, 1993). In an international context, a strategy of relatively small 
expansion steps (for instance, when entering a new country where a firm has not invested 
Chapter 2 
 14
before) allows companies to learn about local conditions (the local culture, language, 
customers, competitors, policies, etc.) and develop local knowledge bases. Firms may rely on 
and build on these knowledge bases in the future, while limiting their overall risk (Johanson 
& Vahlne, 1977, 1990). Such relatively small steps, using partial stakes in foreign investment 
projects as opposed to larger investments, are particularly valuable the more uncertain the 
firm is about its chances to succeed in the host country (cf. Bowman & Hurry, 1993; Reuer & 
Leiblein, 2000; Rivoli & Salorio, 1996). Uncertainty and risk tax the value of firm resources 
committed to a foreign venture, and this ‘tax’ is comparably lower when investment outlays 
are smaller. The small as well as the large stakes can help the firm to secure an opportunity 
(platform) for future expansion in the new market should it prove attractive, but small stakes 
are relatively less expensive ways of doing so, in particular when uncertainty is high.5 From 
this perspective, small rather than large ‘probes’ – or minority rather than majority IJVs – 
appear particularly valuable means of exploring uncertain environments. 
 Exploration through IJVs does not come without additional burdens though. Firms 
using such complex investment vehicles as IJVs (Lyles, 1988) grow increasingly complex 
themselves (Reuer & Leiblein, 2000). In addition to the normal tasks of selecting suppliers, 
handling customers, etc., internationalizing companies also need to deal and coordinate with a 
partner with a different culture (Barkema et al., 1996) and appropriately handle the investment 
vehicle itself (Barkema et al., 1997). Failure in either of these domains (such as 
misunderstanding or conflicts due to differences in national cultures or inappropriate 
role-playing) may influence the payoffs of the other variables (e.g., negate the benefits from 
how well suppliers are selected, key customers are dealt with, etc.), and eventually cause the 
IJV to fail. This underscores the idea that relationships between organizational variables are 
                                                 
5 If we view IJVs as real options to expand stakes (cf. Kogut, 1991), then a minority stake implies 
larger option than a majority stake. As value of (real) options increases in uncertainty, the option value 
of a minority IJV is expected to increase more than the option value of a majority IJV.  
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complex in terms of their influence on outcome variables (McKelvey, 1999, Levinthal, 1997), 
in particular when expanding through IJVs. An important implication of this complexity is 
that IJV experience is difficult to interpret and subject to causal ambiguity (Levitt & March, 
1988; March, Sproul, & Tamuz, 1991). Therefore, companies may require multiple IJV 
experiences to develop sufficient understanding of probability distribution of certain events 
(cf. Lyles, 1988). Decision-makers may also need to experiment with different configurations 
before they are able to make sense of the underlying causal model and to adopt valuable 
routines.  
Importantly, minority and majority IJVs imply different roles for participating 
companies. Recent research in the context of acquisitions suggests that in early stages and 
with little experience, companies may be imperfectly aware of the differences among 
acquisitions, resulting in incorrect generalizations of what the company learned in the context 
of one type of acquisition to another type of acquisition (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). Such 
incorrectly applied lesson may hamper rather than enhance performance of subsequent 
acquisitions. Similar generalizations may occur in the case of IJVs. Companies having gained 
some experience with one type of IJVs (for instance, majority IJVs) may generalize the 
experience and knowledge (in terms of causal models and routines) to settings where such 
knowledge does not necessarily apply (for instance, to minority IJVs). This may hurt 
performance when firms begin using minority and majority IJVs. Firms develop the 
knowledge (i.e., models and routines) how to create and operate minority and majority IJVs 
through experience. It is also through experience that companies can learn the scope 
conditions, i.e., the conditions under which they can apply one type of models and routines 
rather than the other. 
In sum, learning from IJVs is difficult because of their inherent complexity, which 
makes it hard for firms to disentangle what impacts performance of minority and majority 
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IJVs, and which knowledge can or cannot be transplanted between the two investment 
vehicles (cf. Levinthal, 1997; Penrose, 1995). Below, we investigate these effects in more 
detail, and distinguish, both conceptually and empirically, between minority and majority 
IJVs as different forms of exploring foreign settings. More specifically, we will argue that 
when faced with uncertainty, for instance, political risk of the host country (Henisz & Delios, 
2001) or cultural differences (Barkema et al., 1996), small stakes in investments (minority 
IJVs) will be used, which will enhance firm value. However, with more experience in a 
particular ‘cultural block’ (for instance, South East Asia, Latin America, etc.; Ronen & 
Shenkar, 1985), firms will develop better models and more complete knowledge bases about 
local ‘time and place’ (Hayek, 1945). This will decrease the uncertainty they face when 
undertaking new IJVs in that cultural block, making majority IJVs (with the focal foreign 
parent taking the lead) more likely and more valuable than minority IJVs. Furthermore, we 
will argue that experience with a particular investment mode (i.e., minority or majority IJVs) 
will make future investments along those lines both more likely and more valuable, while 





Political hazards. Exploration of some countries involves substantial political hazards for 
foreign firms at the time of entry, for instance due to a weak institutional or legal 
infrastructure in the host country (Henisz, 2002; Henisz & Delios, 2001). Weak (independent) 
local institutional and legislative systems imply that it is more difficult for local executives or 
ruling parties to credibly commit to a certain policy or course of action, which implies 
additional uncertainty for the foreign firms. This is because changes in (the preferences of) the 
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local executives or ruling party, or lobbying by host-country competitors or other incumbents, 
may damage the interests of the foreign firm, as it may be unprotected against such hazards 
by the local institutional and legislative environment. This imposes additional uncertainty on 
the firm’s local investments (Henisz & Delios, 2001). If an unfavorable state of the world 
emerged, it might not only lead to expropriation of the firm’s assets and profits, but also 
prevent it from identifying and exercising future investment opportunities in this country after 
losing the initial toehold. 
At the time of entry, the firm does not know whether these political hazards will 
decrease in the future (i.e., whether a stronger institutional and legislative structure will 
emerge in the host country) or not. Fearing negative consequences for its ability to generate 
rents from local operations, the firm is likely to choose a small rather than large stake in an 
IJV. Moreover, the larger the political uncertainty, the more important it becomes for the firm 
to avoid the downside risk associated with expropriated assets or lost revenues and profits, 
making minority IJVs increasingly more valuable compared to majority IJVs. Formally, 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The larger the political hazards of the host country, the higher the 
likelihood of a minority rather than a majority IJV.  
 
Hypothesis 1b: The larger the political hazards of the host country, the higher the 
value of a minority stake in an IJV compared to a majority stake. 
 
Cultural differences. Culture has been defined as a ‘collective programming of the mind’ 
(Hofstede, 2001; first edition in 1980). Both theory and evidence suggest that national 
cultures are converging slowly, if at all, and that cultural differences remain a source of 
hazard for FDI and IJVs in particular (Barkema et al., 1996; Barkema & Vermeulen, 1997; 
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Hofstede, 2001; Li, 1995). Large differences in cultures imply that the (inexperienced) firm’s 
causal models and routines regarding how to operate in the cultural context of the host 
country will likely be inappropriate and incomplete. Cultural differences may also be 
associated with differences in interpretative schemes of the foreign and local IJV partners, 
which may hamper the flow of information between them (Schein, 1985), and increase the 
likelihood of misunderstanding and conflict (Schneider & Barsoux, 1997). While this is true 
for both minority and majority IJVs, cultural differences may be more problematic in the case 
of the latter. For a majority partner in an IJV, with their large bargaining power (cf. Blodgett, 
1992), it is legitimate to exercise larger influence on the IJV’s strategic direction as compared 
to a minority partner (cf. Child, 2002). The majority partner is also more likely to be involved 
in every-day operations of the IJV, in particular if the local partner is provided with 
technology or other resources requiring close supervision over the production process and 
quality (Child et al., 1997). Involvement in daily operations may also imply interactions with 
local parties, for instance through selection of suppliers, contacts with key costumers, etc. 
Large cultural differences – particularly when the company has little experience with the local 
culture – increase the risk of suboptimal strategies being chosen, but also the likelihood of 
misunderstanding and conflict with the additional local parties as well.  
Hence, large cultural differences between the home and host countries of 
internationalizing companies favor the selection of minority IJVs rather than majority IJVs, as 
this minimizes their exposure to downside risk, while allowing them to explore and learn 
about the host countries. At the same time, as more resources are put at risk when expanding 
through a majority as compared to a minority stake in an IJV, the value of the former will be 
taxed more than the value of the latter with increasing cultural differences. In short, we expect 
the following: 
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Hypothesis 2a: The larger the cultural differences between the home and host 
countries of the focal firm, the higher the likelihood of a minority rather than a majority IJV.  
 
Hypothesis 2b: The larger the cultural differences between the home and host 
countries of the focal firm, the higher the value of a minority stake in an IJV compared to a 
majority stake. 
 
Experience in a cultural block. ‘Cultural blocks’ are groups of countries with similar 
national cultures, i.e., with relatively low within-cluster variance of cultures as compared to 
the variance between clusters (Ronen & Shenkar, 1985; examples include South East Asia, 
Latin America, Anglo-Saxon countries, etc.). This notion has been strongly advocated 
(Shenkar, 2001) and empirically validated in prior literature (e.g., Barkema et al., 1996; 
Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Park & Ungson, 1997). Importantly, it is consistent with 
conceptions and strategies of internationalization (Buckley & Ghauri, 2004), which imply that 
companies often use one country as a test market, and after initial success roll out to similar 
countries in the region (Barkema et al., 1996; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 1990).  
Experience in one country in a cultural block endows the company, first of all, with 
specific knowledge of the particular ‘time and place,’ about local suppliers, customers, 
competitors, etc., reducing uncertainty in this domain. Second, local experience is likely to 
endow the company with increasingly complete and accurate models and routines about how 
to operate in the local culture. The similarity with the cultures of other countries in the same 
cultural block implies that (part of the) knowledge and routines will likely be transferable to 
these other countries as well (cf. Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Penrose, 1995). Moreover, the 
local experience may endow the company with better models and routines regarding political 
systems rooted in the particular belief structures and values associated with the culture. Such 
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experience may also mitigate political threats if networks are built with local leaders or ruling 
parties (cf. McGrath, 1999). Participation in such networks reduces the likelihood of assets 
and future revenues being lost. To the extent that other countries within the same cultural 
block have similar political systems, institutions- and policy-related aspects of the local 
experience may be transferable to them as well (e.g., Central and Eastern Europe, Latin 
America, etc.). For all these reasons, we expect that large experience in a particular cultural 
block increases the likelihood of selecting majority IJVs rather than minority IJVs, and 
increases the value of majority IJVs as compared to minority IJVs. Formally:  
 
Hypothesis 3a: The larger the firm’s experience in a particular cultural block, the 
higher the likelihood of a majority rather than a minority IJV.  
 
Hypothesis 3b: The larger the firm’s experience in a particular cultural block, the 
higher the value of a majority stake in an IJV compared to a minority stake. 
 
Expansion mode experience.  IJVs are complex investment vehicles. They require the focal 
company to cooperate with a partner from a different national culture in the context of an 
alliance, which implies intensive and complex role-playing. In general, experience with a 
particular expansion mode is associated with improved performance of that mode (cf. 
Barkema et al., 1997). Hence, we expect that experience with minority IJVs will endow the 
company with knowledge (causal models and routines) of how to play that role of a minority 
partner successfully. Such experiences and routines will increase the likelihood and improve 
the performance of future minority IJVs. Likewise, we expect that experience with majority 
IJVs will enhance the likelihood and performance of future majority IJVs.  
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Theoretically, playing one role in an IJV (for instance, as a minority partner) may also 
serve as a platform for the focal company to learn how to play the other role (for instance, that 
of a majority party) from observing its partner through vicarious learning (Levitt & March, 
1988). However, we expect such learning effects (in terms of better knowledge, routines, etc.) 
to be weaker than the learning from the focal company’s own experience with majority IJVs. 
First, part of this knowledge is tacit and may only be gained through own experience, where 
the problems encountered in playing the role induce a search for better solutions (Simon, 
1957), which enhances learning and development of better routines. Second, learning from 
observations of others is more superficial than learning from own experience, and therefore 
subject to oversimplification, misinterpretation, misattribution, and erroneous inferences; as a 
result superstitious learning may occur (Levinthal & March, 1993; Levitt & March, 1988), 
and misapplication of experience is likely (cf. Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). Thus, 
specialized experience gained in one role (for instance, as a minority partner in an IJV) may 
not only be less useful but even harmful when transplanted to the settings of other roles (for 
instance, as a majority partner; cf. Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Martin & Park, 2005). Only 
after having played both roles may firms develop the knowledge (i.e., models and routines) 
how to operate both minority and majority IJVs, and the knowledge of conditions under 
which one type of routines, models, etc. applies and when the other. This implies that 
experience with playing one role is valuable for firms when they choose to play it again, but 
not necessarily when they choose to play the other role. 
 While the experience with a particular mode increases the ability to operate that 
mode, it may also increase the likelihood of using the same mode in later stages (cf. 
Amburgey, Kelley, & Barnett, 1993), as firms typically seek in the neighborhood of prior 
problems and solutions for new ways of handling current problems (Cyert & March, 1963; 
Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Nelson & Winter, 1982). However, continued use of a particular 
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investment vehicle may not only lead to incremental improvements, but also to inertia and 
suboptimal choices as a result (cf. Levinthal & March, 1993). Indeed, much experience in a 
particular role may reduce the company’s flexibility to play opposite roles. For instance, 
companies with much experience in taking the lead in managing IJVs (as in majority IJVs) 
may have problems allowing partners to be in the ‘driver’s seat,’ to compromise, and to help 
others succeed. For all these reasons, we expect companies to learn from prior experience 
with minority (majority) roles how to successfully handle future investments of the same type, 
and make future investments of the same type more likely and more valuable, as compared to 
the other type. Formally:  
 
Hypothesis 4a: The larger the firm’s experience with majority IJVs, the higher the 
likelihood of a majority rather than a minority IJV. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: The larger the firm’s experience with majority IJVs, the higher the 
value of a majority stake in an IJV compared to a minority stake. 
 
 
Hypothesis 5a: The larger the firm’s experience with minority IJVs, the higher the 
likelihood of a minority rather than a majority JV.  
 
Hypothesis 5b: The larger the firm’s experience with minority IJVs, the higher the 
value of a minority stake in an IJV compared to a majority stake. 
 
 





We tested our hypotheses on a longitudinal database of all non-financial firms listed on the 
main segment of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange in 1993.6 These firms operated in a wide 
variety of industries, including chemical and pharmaceutical products, paper and packaging, 
food products, brewing, retailing, publishing and printing, trade, and tank storage. No data 
were gathered on the four largest firms (Royal Dutch Shell, Unilever, Philips, Akzo) since 
they differed considerably from the other firms in terms of international experience, scope, 
and size, leaving 25 companies. We included IJVs over a period of 26 years (1973-1998). The 
average number of employees of the firms over the sample period was 12,475 and their 
average sales amounted to EUR 1.7 billion. 
We collected data on all 292 IJVs of these firms that were both recorded in their annual 
reports during the window of analysis and announced in the Dutch financial daily, Het 
Financieele Dagblad (which we used to determine the IJV announcement dates). We found 
sufficient information about 266 out of these 292 IJVs that allowed us to estimate a logit 
model for the choice of minority versus majority investment mode. In our firm value creation 
models, IJV announcements that coincided with the announcements of other ventures of the 
same company (on the previous, same, or following day) were further excluded from the 
sample to avoid contamination of the effect of the focal announcement on firm value with 
other (value-relevant) news. After accounting for the necessary exclusions and any missing 
data, the sample on which our hypotheses were tested included 266 IJVs in logit analyses and 
200 IJVs in firm value analyses.  
                                                 
6 We selected the firms from the main funds segment (35 firms) to limit the distorting impact of thin 
trading, a particularly problematic issue when analyzing expansions from the 1970s. 
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 Next, in order to measure experience of the sample parent firms with different cultures 
and investment vehicles, data on all prior international expansions of these companies 
undertaken since 1966 were collected from their annual reports. 1966 was chosen as the base 
year because it marked the beginning of a period of vigorous internationalization of the 
sample firms, and because older annual reports were difficult to obtain or lacking the required 
information. Annual reports were also the source of accounting data used in the analyses. 
 
2.6.2. Analysis 
Our hypotheses predicted effects of firm- and contextual-variables on both the choice of an 
investment vehicle and its implications for firm value. Therefore, we began the empirical 
analyses by estimating a classic logit model for the choice of majority versus minority IJVs, 
using robust standard errors specification (StataCorp, 2001). The logit model allowed us to 
estimate the likelihood that a parent firm chooses to enter a foreign market with a majority 
rather than a minority IJV, conditional on the hypothesized factors. Next, we used the event 
study methodology to quantify abnormal changes in stock prices of sample firms upon 
announcements of IJV formations, which we then used as a dependent variable in second-
order multiple regressions. Below we explain this second step of our analyses in more detail. 
Event study methodology has often been used in strategy research to assess the 
influence of strategic decisions – such as exploration of foreign markets through IJVs – on 
firm value (e.g., Anand & Khanna, 2000; Kale et al., 2002). This approach (cf. Fama, 1976; 
McWilliams & Siegel, 1997) rests on the assumption of semi-strong stock market efficiency. 
Thus, we assume that changes in share prices around corporate announcements provide 
unbiased assessments of their economic consequences from the perspective of the company’s 
shareholders (Fama, 1976). In line with the theory and hypotheses developed in this paper, the 
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use of event study method allows us to capture how much additional value a firm creates 
when choosing to enter a host country using minority and majority IJVs.  
Consistent with most prior research, we calculated abnormal returns using the market 
model (Fama, 1976; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). For each IJV, we regressed the company’s 
daily stock returns of each of the sample firms on a benchmark index over a period of 121 
trading days (approximately 6 months, from t = -136 to t = -16, where t = 0 was the 
announcement day of the IJV in Het Financieele Dagblad). The benchmark chosen for this 
study was the Amsterdam Stock Exchange (AEX) index. Since AEX index was only initiated 
in 1983, stock prices around announcements of IJV formations from the 1973-1982 part of the 
sample period were regressed on AEX-equivalent index calculated by Datastream, our source 
of stock market data.7 Abnormal returns were calculated as a difference between returns 
predicted by the market model and share prices actually observed on focal trading days. In our 
regression analyses, we used the cumulative abnormal returns over the days t = -1 and t = 0 as 
the dependent variable. Thus, we accounted for potential early information arrival, for 
instance for IJVs that were announced before the stock market closed on the day prior to the 
publication in Het Financieele Dagblad.  
Next, we used the cumulative abnormal returns as the dependent variable in an OLS 
regression framework, using the White covariance matrix estimator to control for potential 
heteroskedasticity. Our predictions about the value of minority versus majority IJVs, 
contingent on the hypothesized factors, were tested as follows. We mean-centered all 
continuous independent variables. This prevented the occurrence of collinearity problems and 
facilitated the interpretation of estimation results (Aiken & West, 1991). Each main term 
(accompanying an interaction term) represented the effect of a variable on the value of 
                                                 
7 Stock returns were adjusted for capital changes (e.g., stock splits, buybacks, regular capital issues, 
takeovers) and for dividend payments. The returns were calculated in logarithmic terms to make the 
departure of daily data from normality less severe (Fama, 1976). Similarly, the benchmark index 
returns were in logarithmic form. 
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minority IJVs. The interaction term showed how much the impact of a variable on the value 
of majority IJVs differed from the effect of this variable on the value of minority IJVs. Hence, 
the interaction effects allowed direct tests of our predictions of how the value of majority IJVs 
was influenced by the hypothesized factors compared with that of minority IJVs.  
 
2.6.3. Variables 
Minority and majority IJVs. Consistent with prior research into IJVs (for example, 
Hennart, 1988), we operationalized IJVs as partial stakes in either foreign start-ups or 
acquisitions – signifying partial rather than full ownership of foreign investments. In line with 
our theory, the discrete measure of ownership, in the form of minority and majority IJVs, took 
account of the fact that these IJVs may not only differ in quantitative but also in qualitative 
terms, with respect to roles and responsibilities (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Hennart, 1991; 
Pennings et al., 1994). Hence, we classified all IJVs in terms of whether they were minority- 
or majority-owned by the internationalizing firms,8 using a majority entry dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the expansion was majority-owned, and 0 otherwise (labeled as minority entries). 
This dummy was used as a dependent variable in the logit model and as an independent 
variable in multivariate regressions.  
Political hazards. We measured the political uncertainty of a host country using 
Henisz’ (2002) political hazards index (adjusted in such a way that high values implied high 
political uncertainty, and multiplied by 100). Consistent with our theory, Henisz’ time-
varying index captures a rich set of characteristics of the institutional and political 
environments of a particular country in a particular year. The index takes account of checks 
                                                 
8 Some IJVs were 50% owned. To create mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive categories, 
the 50%-owned IJVs were added to the minority category. We did exploratory analysis using 50%-
owned IJVs as a separate category. They appeared to be significantly different from majority IJVs and 
similar to minority ones in terms of effects, consistent with a taxonomy of 50%-owned IJVs as part of 
the minority IJV category. Exclusion of the 50%-owned ventures from the sample led to similar 
support for our hypotheses (while reducing sample size). 
Minority and majority IJVs 
 27
and balances imposed on local leaders and parties, in the form of independent judges and 
courts, veto power of legislative chambers, etc., to measure a nation’s ability to credibly 
commit to policies (see Henisz, 2002, for a more extensive description). Hence, the measure 
captures host country political risk that is particularly relevant for firms exploring foreign 
markets. 
Cultural differences between a host country and the home country (the Netherlands) 
of internationalizing firms were measured using the Kogut and Singh’s index (Kogut & 
Singh, 1988) based on the four dimensions of culture by Hofstede (1980), i.e. power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance, individualism / collectivism, and masculinity / femininity. 
Additionally, sensitivity analyses using the Euclidean and the five-dimensional measures of 
cultural distance (including long-term orientation dimension; Barkema & Vermeulen, 1997; 
Hofstede, 2001) were conducted.  
Cultural block experience. As was done in earlier studies (Barkema et al., 1996; 
Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Park & Ungson, 1997), we used the concept of cultural blocks 
as defined and measured by Ronen and Shenkar (1985), who synthesized the outcomes of 
eight earlier studies of culture. We extended their original classification with a post-
communist block, which included the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (originally not 
assigned to any other cultural block). Cultural block experience was measured as the number 
of prior expansions of a focal firm in the particular cultural block from 1966 onwards.  
Majority and minority IJV experience. We operationalized majority IJV experience 
as the number of prior majority IJVs of the focal firm from 1966 onwards; likewise for 
minority IJVs. 
Control variables. Some countries impose constraints on FDI inflow more than 
others, restricting the governance modes that foreign firms can choose. Using the 
International Monetary Fund annual reports on foreign exchange arrangements and 
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restrictions, we constructed a time-varying dummy variable equal to 1 if a host country’s 
policies restricted FDI inflow and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, in large firms, IJVs may have 
smaller effects on firm value (measured as abnormal returns) because their market 
capitalization is greater or because media contacts may be more intensive and news may 
trickle to the capital market in a more piecemeal way. Hence, we controlled for firm size, 
using the natural logarithm of the book value of the parent firm’s assets, expressed in 
thousands of Dutch guilders and adjusted for consumer price index changes. We also 
controlled for the firm’s financial leverage (measured as the ratio of total liabilities to assets), 
since it may affect the firm’s performance and ability to invest in new ventures (Jensen, 
1986).  
Next, we took account of the fact that the effect of the announcement of an IJV may 
be confounded by other news released by the parent company, which may also influence the 
stock price. Although such potentially confounding events should be controlled for to avoid 
potential biases resulting from the so-called (other) event-induced variance and event 
clustering (Brown & Warner, 1980), few studies in strategic management have actually done 
so. Hence, we proposed a crude yet tractable method to control for such possible effects. We 
distinguished between four qualitatively different types of potentially value-relevant 
announcements (and screened Het Financieele Dagblad issues published three weeks prior to 
and after the announcement date of the focal IJV to determine whether these types of 
announcements had been made or not): profitability related announcements (for example, 
profit warnings); announcements of other expansions; changes in the ownership of non-focal 
ventures; and more general changes in strategy. We then created dummy variables capturing 
whether a given type of announcement was made by the focal firm around the time when 
news about establishing an IJV appeared in financial press. Three of these four control 
variables (coded 1 if the particular type of announcement was made; 0 otherwise) had a 
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significantly positive impact on cumulative abnormal returns, and hence were kept in our 
models, jointly explaining 11% of the variance. The means, standard deviations, and 
correlation coefficients of the variables are presented in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1. Means, standard deviations, and correlations  
  Meana S.d. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
1 Abnormal returns  .47%   .03  
2 Political hazards   .63   .18 -.17  
3 Cultural distance  2.70  1.20 -.05 .38  
4 Cultural block experience  9.86 11.47 .15 -.14 -.15  
5 Majority IJV experience  4.98  4.67 -.11 .26 .25 .09  
6 Minority IJV experience   11.07  9.02 -.12 .26 .26 .20 .56  
7 Majority entry  .32  .47 .02 -.13 .08 -.04 .05 -.17 
8 FDI restrictions  .13  .34 -.12 .48 .47 -.13 .21 .30 -.13
9  Firm size 13.61   .90 -.02 .14 .10 .13 .46 .50 -.16 .13
10 Leverage   .52   .65 .01 -.13 -.19 .01 -.12 -.14 .01 -.17 .16
a Values are for raw (non-centered) variables. Centering has no impact on standard errors and 




2.7.1. Hypotheses testing 
Results of the logit analysis of the choice between majority and minority IJVs are presented in 
Model 1 in Table 2.2. The results are consistent with Hypothesis 1a, which predicted that the 
probability of choosing a majority IJV as opposed to minority IJV was negatively related to 
political hazards of the host country. We also found support for Hypothesis 3a, implying that 
the likelihood of majority IJVs increases with experience of a parent firm in the focal cultural 
block. Firms experienced with playing majority partner roles in IJVs appeared to prefer 
majority IJVs, as predicted by Hypothesis 4a. Analogously, experienced minority players had 
a preference for exploring foreign markets through minority IJVs, consistently with 
Hypothesis 5a. The data did not support Hypothesis 2a, however, implying that cultural 
differences have no clear impact on firm preferences for one type of IJV over the other.  
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Table 2.2. Results of logit analysis of the choice of majority IJV versus minority IJV a 
 Model 1 
Political hazards -1.73* (.96) 
Cultural distance    .07 (.13) 
Cultural block experience    .03* (.01) 
Majority IJV experience    .11** (.04) 
Minority IJV experience -  .04* (.02) 
FDI restrictions -  .49 (.53) 
Firm size -  .35† (.18) 
Leverage    .14 (.23) 
Intercept -  .60*** (.15) 
Wald χ2 22.51** 
Pseudo R-squared .08 
a N = 266. The robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels are one-tailed for 
predicted effects and two-tailed otherwise. 
          † p  <  .10 
     * p  <  .05 
   ** p  <  .01 
 *** p  <  .001  
 
Hypothesis 1b implied that the value of minority IJVs compared with that of majority 
IJVs increases more strongly with the political hazards of a host country. Consistent with this 
prediction, the results presented in Model 3 (Table 2.3) show that the interaction effect of the 
majority entry dummy and political hazards is significantly negative (p < .05). The coefficient 
implies, for instance, that on average, as the political hazards of a host country increase by 10 
percentage points, minority IJVs create .42% more firm value – or EUR 3.31 million of 
market capitalization – than majority IJVs. Hypothesis 2b – that the value of minority IJVs 
relative to that of majority IJVs increases with cultural distance more strongly– is also 
corroborated (the corresponding effect in Model 4 has the predicted sign, p < .05). 
Hypothesis 3b – that the value of majority IJVs relative to that of minority IJVs 
increases with experience in a cultural block – is corroborated as well (p < .001, Model 5). 
The estimation results imply that, on average, when a firm’s cultural block experience 
increases by 1, a majority IJV creates .15% (or, on average, EUR 1.18 million) more value for 
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Table 2.3. Results of multiple regression analyses of value created by IJVs a 
 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Political hazards  
x Majority entry 
 -41.53* 
(22.77) 
   -19.65 
(22.17) 
Cultural distance  
x Majority entry 
  -7.69* 
(3.35) 
  -4.38† 
(2.93) 
Cultural block experience  
x Majority entry 
    1.49*** 
 (.45) 
  1.51***
  (.47) 
Majority IJV experience  
x Majority entry 




Minority IJV experience  
x Majority entry 
    -1.96** 
  (.65) 
-1.82** 
  (.60) 




































Cultural block experience    .45 
  (.29) 
   .48 
  (.29) 
   .51† 
  (.29) 
   .03 
  (.18) 
   .43 
  (.30) 
   .06 
  (.19) 
Majority IJV experience   -.51 
  (.49) 
  -.53 
  (.49) 
  -.49 
  (.50) 
  -.67 
  (.48) 
-1.16* 
  (.48) 
-1.28** 
  (.48) 
Minority IJV experience   -.53 
  (.32) 
  -.49 
  (.32) 
  -.45 
  (.31) 
  -.41 
  (.28) 
  -.15 
  (.35) 
   .01 
  (.29) 






























   .52 
(1.51) 
   .00 
(1.56) 
   .58 
(1.56) 












Confounding events controlled for 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic  2.55*  2.52**  2.53**  3.15*** 2.98***  3.31***
R-squared     .19    .20    .21    .27   .23    .33 
  a N = 200. The estimated coefficients and the robust standard errors (in parentheses below the 
estimates) are all multiplied by 103. Significance levels are one-tailed for hypothesized effects and 
two-tailed otherwise. 
          † p  <  .10 
     * p  <  .05 
   ** p  <  .01 
 *** p  <  .001  
 
its parent firm than a minority IJV. Finally, Hypotheses 4b and 5b – that the value of majority 
IJVs relative to that of minority IJVs increases with majority IJV experience but decreases 
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with minority IJV experience – are also corroborated (Model 6). We also estimated a full 
model (Model 7), which corroborated earlier results, but with Hypothesis 2b now marginally 
supported and the effect implied by Hypothesis 1b no longer significant. 
 
2.7.2. Additional analyses 
In order to assure robustness of the above results, we re-estimated our models using several 
additional control variables. First, three alternative measures of cultural distance were 
computed and used instead of the four-dimensional Kogut and Singh’s (1988) index: (1) the 
five-dimensional Kogut and Singh’s index (with the long-term orientation dimension of 
culture accounted for; Hofstede, 2001); (2) the four-dimensional Euclidean index; (3) the 
five-dimensional Euclidean index. These additional analyses (despite substantially smaller 
sample size in models with five-dimensional measures of cultural distance due to missing 
data) rendered results consistent with Hypotheses 2a and 2b.  
Next, we included host country’s GNP and the growth rate of GNP per capita (which 
limited the sample to 180 observations owing to missing data) to take into account that rich 
countries have much spending power and that growing economies may present more 
opportunities than stagnant ones, which may affect the choice between minority and majority 
IJVs. The results were very similar to those presented above, while the additional variables 
turned statistically insignificant. This was also the case when we controlled for overall 
international experience of firms (measured as number of all prior foreign subsidiaries a firm 
established between 1966 and the focal IJV formation) and their geographic diversity 
(measured as number of countries a firm had subsidiaries in at the moment of IJV formation), 
which was meant to account for their possible impact on firm performance (cf. Goerzen & 
Beamish, 2003; 2005), and hence their value creation capabilities. We also ran models using 
year dummy variables; an entry mode dummy (indicating whether the IJV was a greenfield 
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investment or an acquisition); an unrelated diversification dummy (to account for entries in 
businesses unrelated to core activities of the parent firms); cultural block dummies, and firm 
dummies. No significant effects of these additional variables were found and the support for 
the hypotheses remained unchanged. Next, we estimated a Heckman sample selection model 
(Greene, 2003) to take into account that firms may first choose between IJVs and fully owned 
investments (bearing value maximization in mind) before deciding between majority and 
minority IJVs. However, the Heckman correction factor turned out to be insignificant and the 
estimation results were equally supportive of our hypotheses as those reported earlier in Table 
2.3.  
Finally, in order to assure predictive validity of the results presented above, we also 
explored long-term accounting performance implications for firms using ‘correct’ strategies 
(i.e., choosing minority and majority IJVs as implied by our theory), as opposed to firms that 
did so to a lesser degree. More specifically, for each IJV, based on the logit model (Table 2.2) 
we simulated which investment vehicle (i.e., majority or minority IJV) would have been 
‘correct’ according to our theory, as a function of actual scores of political hazards, cultural 
distance, cultural block experience, and firm experience with minority and majority IJVs. 
Subsequently, following a procedure suggested by Anderson (1988), we compared the 
simulated mode choice with the actual mode selected by the firm in order to create an index of 
conformity (ranging from 0 to 1) of the simulated choice to the actual one. Actual choices 
diverging from simulated ones by at most .5 were labeled ‘correct’ and received a code of 1; 
all other cases were labeled ‘incorrect’ and coded 0.  
Next, for each firm in each year, we calculated the percentage of prior ‘correctly’ 
designed IJVs (from 1966). We subsequently estimated a model in which the average three-
year accounting performance (ROE t=0, t=+2) was regressed on this percentage of correct past 
choices (i.e., the ‘correctness’ of the strategy), the number of prior IJVs of the firm since 1966 
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(the importance of the strategy for the company), and several control variables (also used in 
prior similar studies). Since we expected the impact of the number of IJVs on the firm’s long-
term accounting performance to depend on the ‘correctness’ of the strategy, we also included 
an interaction variable. The estimation results are presented in Table 2.4. 
 
Table 2.4. Results of two-way fixed-effects panel regression analysis of firm profitability a 
 Model 8 
Percent of correctly designed IJVs b    .64*   (.32) 
Total number of IJVs c   -.76 (1.33) 
Percent of correctly designed IJVs x total number of IJVs    .13***   (.04) 
International experience d    -.81   (.52) 
Number of foreign expansions e  4.48* (1.86) 
Cultural diversity f -7.54 (5.54) 
Product scope g   -.29 (1.05) 
Firm size  -37.15*** (10.61) 
Leverage   38.81*** (10.23) 
Intercept  60.57*** (8.76) 
Year dummy variables Included 
F-statistic  10.45*** 
R-squared Within: .36 Overall: .23 
a  N = 507 (number of companies times number of years minus lines with missing data). The 
dependent variable is the average ROE over years t, t +1, and t + 2. Based on the Hausman test, a 
fixed rather than random effects specification was chosen, as the assumptions of the former would 
have been violated otherwise. The fixed firm effects are jointly significant (F-statistic = 9.12***). 
Estimates of the (significant) year-specific effects are suppressed. The estimated coefficients and 
the standard errors (in parentheses) are all multiplied by 103. Significance levels are one-tailed for 
predicted effects and two-tailed otherwise. 
b Mean-centered cumulative number of IJVs (up till year t), for which the absolute value of the 
predicted probability of an IJV being majority owned (from Model 1) minus dummy for majority 
entry < 0.5, divided by the total number of IJVs, and multiplied by 100. 
c Mean-centered cumulative number of IJVs up till year t. 
d Mean-centered cumulative number of foreign expansions up till year t-1. 
e Mean-centered number of foreign expansions in year t. 
f Mean-centered number of cultural blocks in which a firm was active in year t. 
g Mean-centered number of different 3-digit industry codes in which a firm was active in year t. 
          † p  <  .10 
     * p  <  .05 
   ** p  <  .01 
*** p  <  .001 
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The results showed that the more ‘correct’ strategies do indeed imply better long-term 
accounting performance (p < .05) in terms of average three-year ROE following the 
expansion. The effect of the number of IJVs on the firm’s long-term accounting performance 
runs through the correctness of the strategy suggested by our theory (i.e., the interaction term 
has the expected positive sign, p < .001). The estimation results imply, for instance, that 
companies which make 90% of their strategic choices ‘correctly’ at a number of IJVs that is 
two standard deviations above the mean, have a 9 percentage point higher profitability than 
firms which make half of their choices ‘correctly’ at an average number of IJVs (predicted 
ROEs of .22 and .13, respectively). In sum, companies acting in line with our theory are not 
only rewarded by investors, but also (much) more profitable over long periods of time. 
 
 
2.8. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Many firms are internationalizing nowadays, often in a race with rivals to get to new countries 
and regions first, in their quest to become one of the global players in their industries and 
survive in the long run. Not all of them are successful. In this paper, building on prior 
research we reasoned that exploratory expansions into foreign countries – such as minority 
and majority IJVs – may be characteristic of the successful firms. We argued that minority 
and majority IJVs differ in important ways, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The 
quantitative difference – that in equity stake – implied different amounts of resources 
committed to IJVs by parent firms, and hence, ceteris paribus, different extents of exposure to 
risk. The qualitative difference – that in roles played by the partners – implied that 
experiences with one investment vehicle are not necessarily transplantable to the other. These 
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differences, we argued, impact managerial choices and firm value creation capabilities 
associated with minority and majority IJVs.  
The empirical evidence presented in this paper largely corroborated our conjectures 
concerning the choice and value created by minority and majority IJVs, contingent on 
political and cultural hazards, and on the firm’s experience with particular cultures and 
investment modes. The last result – about learning from minority and majority IJV experience 
– was consistent with and extended earlier studies suggesting that minority and majority IJVs 
differ in terms of roles, responsibilities, and capabilities (cf. Child, 2002; Child et al., 1997; 
Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004; Pennings et al., 1994). We argued that different models of 
role-playing are needed, and that firms learn in particular from prior expansions of the same 
type.  
The combined theory and evidence suggested that the gains from experience are likely 
to be confined to areas closely related to past experience. This implies that it matters how 
organizational experience is measured, and that we need more fine-grained measures of 
experience to unpack the role of experience. More research is needed in this respect. For 
example, transferability of experience between scale and link alliances (cf. Dussauge, 
Garrette, & Mitchell, 2000, 2004; Hennart, 1988) promises to be an interesting avenue for 
future studies. Also, future in-depth research into role-playing by partners in minority and 
majority IJVs, and how their roles evolve over time as equity positions evolve (cf. Ariño & de 
la Torre, 1998; Hagedoorn & Sadowski, 1999; Kogut, 1988; Lyles, 1988; Makhija & Ganesh, 
1997; Reuer, Zollo, & Singh 2002; Schaan, 1988) may prove fruitful.  
Another set of evidence that we provided in this paper allowed us to conclude that 
internationalizing companies which actively explored foreign markets through IJVs were not 
only rewarded by investors – in terms of higher firm value – but also showed superior 
profitability over long periods of time, provided they selected minority and majority IJVs in 
Minority and majority IJVs 
 37
accordance with the theoretical predictions developed in this study. This issue will become 
increasingly relevant, from a managerial perspective, if companies across the globe maintain 
the trend of the last decades to increasingly invest in new countries and regions (for example, 
South East Asia) and if political instability remains an important issue. From methodological 
standpoint, these additional analyses provided support for the claim that our theory – and the 
event study methodology – have predictive validity. Future strategy research may benefit 
from using this and other combinations of methods to empirically validate theoretical 
predictions.  
While most of our hypotheses were consistently supported by the data, one puzzling 
result is that cultural differences appear to influence firm value changes associated with 
formations of minority and majority IJVs, but seem unrelated to managerial choice for one 
investment vehicle over the other. A possible interpretation of this set of results is that 
decision-makers in internationalizing firms do not consider cultural differences as particularly 
relevant (unlike stock market investors). This interpretation is consistent with prior findings 
that managers (like other people) tend to underestimate problems (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982) 
and overestimate their own capabilities, particularly when faced with complex tasks (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974). There is much anecdotal evidence that some managers underestimate 
the problems of investing in different cultural settings (for instance, through acquisitions), 
leading to dramatic problems which must later be repaired at high costs. Investors, being 
distanced from individual firms and expansions, and not personally involved in strategic 
decisions, may be less prone to such biases when considering value implications at the time of 
the decision. More research is needed before definite statements can be made in respect of this 
issue.  
As an extension of this study, it is interesting to note that firms that internationalize 
successfully, do so using strategies similar to those of companies operating in 
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hypercompetitive industries: exploration, ‘probing,’ cooperative ventures, etc. (cf. Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1997). This may be a self-reinforcing phenomenon, where firms engage in 
experimentation in response to environmental pressures, thereby perpetuating turbulence in 
the environment (Bogner & Barr, 2000; Mody, 1993). Indeed, managers of firms operating in 
turbulent environments may continue to act as ‘programmed’ and keep focusing on trial-and-
error learning and new product and process development even after turbulence from the 
external environment diminishes (Bogner & Barr, 2000). The senior managers of companies 
that internationalized successfully through exploratory investments may behave analogously: 
they may have this process ingrained in their behavioral models and routines. After their 
companies emerge as global competitors and begin competing worldwide, this process may 
extend to exploration in other domains, for instance technologies. This suggests a mechanism 
for why globalization leads to more turbulence, change, and uncertainty – even in mature 
industries – in terms of faster development of new products and processes and faster erosion 
of competitive advantage as a limited number of global competitors remain. These 
implications may be explored in future research. 
Naturally, this study is not without limitations. First, we examined firms 
internationalizing from one home country (the Netherlands). Companies rooted in different 
national cultures may differ in their propensity to engage in entrepreneurial behavior when 
faced with change and potential failure (Bogner & Barr, 2000), as well as in their ownership 
and control preferences (Child et al., 1997; Delios & Beamish, 2004; Erramilli, 1996; Hennart 
& Larimo, 1998; Noorderhaven & Harzing, 2003). Even the sample firms showed 
considerable variation in terms of their propensity to explore international environments 
through majority or minority IJVs (see, for example, the high variance in the numbers of IJVs 
in Table 2.1), with firms that actively explored the international environment in the predicted 
ways creating more firm value and showing superior accounting performance. Future research 
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may explore to what extent the findings from our study can be generalized to other cultural 
settings.  
Furthermore, due to limited availability of data on actual equity holdings, we were not 
able to account for potential heterogeneity of IJVs within the minority and majority IJVs 
categories. Intuitively, one may expect that there exist important differences in roles played 
by partners holding close to half of the equity (for example, 49%) and partners holding much 
more or much less than that (for example, 30%). Conceptual and empirical analyses of such 
potential heterogeneity and its relationship with firm performance (cf. Blodgett, 1992) would 
clearly add to the findings of the current study.  
Finally, we focused on IJV formations. However, IJVs are inherently unstable in terms 
of their governance structures (Kogut, 1988; Reuer & Ariño, 2002). Developing theory and 
providing evidence regarding changes in IJV governance structures over time, including their 
buy-outs, from the perspective of firm experience with role-playing, may be another 













Unpacking international experience: Foreign expansion, firm 
value, and role of host country factors 
 
 
3.1. Abstract  
 
Building on organizational learning theory, prior research into the role of international 
experience of firms has typically advocated its positive impact on organizational performance. 
Yet, several key insights from this theory – such as that experience may be inadequate and 
misapplied – were overlooked. We build on these insights to unpack the concept of 
international experience into two more relevant items: its depth and breadth. The positive role 
of experience depth is expected to be reinforced by its breadth. We also expect that 
experience from particularly demanding countries (with respect to political hazards, 
macroeconomic conditions, and cultural differences) is beneficial when expanding into 
similarly challenging countries. Conversely, past experiences from non-challenging countries 
have a liability effect on expansions into particularly demanding locations. Empirical tests on 
a sample of 425 foreign expansions of 25 multinationals over the period of 1982-1998 





In the new ‘competitive landscape’ where new markets are opening up, technologies are 
rapidly developing, and increasingly many cross-border relationships are being established 
(Bettis & Hitt, 1995; Hitt et al., 1998), many firms find themselves operating in globalized, 
hypercompetitive environments (Barkema et al., 2002; Mitchell et al., 1993). As a result, the 
complexity of the tasks that managers of internationalizing firms are confronted with greatly 
exceeds the challenges associated with organizational design (cf. Levinthal & Warglien, 
1999), diversity (cf. Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997), and interdependencies among firm-
specific and environmental characteristics (cf. Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003) they would face in 
a domestic setting.  
Hence, many studies have explored the factors that make firms successful when 
expanding and operating internationally. Among those, variables such as profitability, 
subsidiary survival, sales growth, perceived cost of internationalization, and shareholder 
wealth have been considered as measures of firm success (e.g., Autio, Sapienza, & Almeida, 
2001; Barkema, et al., 1996; Delios & Beamish, 2001; Eriksson, et al, 1997, 2000; Hitt et al. 
1997; Li, 1995; Luo & Peng, 1999; Markides & Ittner, 1994; Shaver, Mitchell, & Yeung, 
1997; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002). Much of this literature has advocated and provided 
evidence for the positive role that foreign experience plays in parent firm and subsidiary 
performance in the process of international growth (e.g., Delios & Beamish, 2001; Luo & 
Peng, 1999; Markides & Ittner, 1994; Shaver et al., 1997). Yet, inconclusive findings also 
abound. Doukas and Travlos (1988) found that host country experience of multinationals was 
insignificantly related to abnormal stock returns upon announcements of their foreign 
acquisitions. Li (1995), in his analyses of U.S. pharmaceutical industry, found an insignificant 
relationship between foreign subsidiary exit rates and prior experience of their parent firms in 
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the U.S.A. Similarly, the Child, Chung, and Davies (2003) study revealed that performance of 
cross-border units in China was insignificantly related to firm experience in this country. 
Also, in their study of subsidiary survival, Barkema et al. (1996) found no universal learning 
effects associated with previous foreign investments in general, or with previous expansions 
into specific host countries or cultural blocks in particular (cf. Ronen & Shenkar, 1985). Such 
findings raise a question whether and under what circumstances we should indeed expect 
foreign experience to render the positive effects advocated in prior studies of firm 
internationalization, that is what sorts of international experience and under what conditions 
are truly valuable for internationalizing firms. 
Organizational learning theory offers valuable insights in this respect. It suggests that 
firm experience can be a mixed blessing. First, redundant experience may possibly result in 
competency traps and harmful lack of experimentation (Levitt & March, 1988; March, 1991). 
Second, experience that is inadequate relative to the environment may possibly lead to 
misapplication of prior experience, inability to absorb a new experience, and / or need to 
‘unlearn’ or abandon current routines (resulting from prior experiences) before developing 
new ones (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Huber, 1991; Levitt & March, 
1988). Consistent with these ideas, prior research in the strategy field showed that 
performance-enhancing effects of experience should not be taken for granted, as the 
applicability and quality of organizational experience is likely to be determined by the 
heterogeneity, novelty, and regularity of occurrence of certain events (e.g., Baum & Ingram, 
1998; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002; Ingram & Baum, 1997).  
Bringing these insights to the field of international business, our study aims to 
contribute to the extant literature by reconciling the relationship between international 
experience and firm value, with particular attention being paid to experience content (cf. Fiol 
& Lyles, 1985) or structure (cf. Levitt & March, 1988) as well as contexts in which it is 
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gathered and deployed. Unlike prior studies of international experience, in our analysis we 
explicitly incorporate the above-mentioned insights from organizational learning theory that 
experience-based routines may potentially lead to problems such as inertia, competency traps, 
or misapplication (cf. Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Levitt & 
March, 1988; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Furthermore, we propose that the diversity of 
experience can help firms to avoid these potential problems.  
We also explore potentially important contingencies for the beneficial impact of 
international experience on value creation in foreign operations, i.e. for the adequacy of 
experience relative to the environment (Levitt & March, 1988). Prior research typically 
assumed that international experience leads to more efficient exploration and exploitation of 
foreign markets, irrespectively of the characteristics of the foreign markets and the type of 
experience a firm relies on when expanding abroad. Our study addresses this conjecture by 
arguing that the contextual factors, such as environmental turbulence or novelty (Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1997; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977), may moderate the relationship between prior 
international experience and firm performance in the process of foreign expansion.  
More specifically, we unpack the concept of international experience into two more 
relevant items capturing the nature of its content (cf. Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Levitt & March, 
1988): the depth and breadth (cf. Huber, 1991; Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt, 2000). Depth refers to 
the mastery of a firm’s routines (Zahra et al., 2000) developed as a result of setting up and 
running foreign subsidiaries in a given host country. Breadth, on the other hand, refers to the 
multitude of diverse cultural, institutional, and macroeconomic settings that the firm has 
experience in, as evidenced by its prior expansions into different countries. Taking a 
contingency perspective, we offer an explanation for prior inconsistent findings regarding the 
relationship between international experience and firm performance. We propose that prior 
experience is particularly valuable when it is simultaneously deep and broad. We also reason 
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that international experience enhances firm value creation capabilities provided it is adequate 
relative to the type of environment (for instance, economically stable or not, culturally remote 
or proximate, etc.) the firm expands into. Conversely, we argue, international experience, if 
misapplied, may become a liability for the firm (cf. Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999).  
The above conjectures were tested on a sample of 425 foreign expansions of 25 firms 
over a period of 17 years (1982-1998), using a 3-step methodology. In the first step, we used 
the event study method to estimate how much shareholder wealth was created with new 
foreign expansions. In the second step, two corrective terms were generated to account for (1) 
entry mode choice and (2) selection of observations based on availability and quality of data 
needed to generate the dependent variable. In the final step, second-order sample-selection 
corrected regression models were run to test our hypotheses. The empirical evidence 





The idea that organizations are capable of learning from their experiences is one of the key 
tenets of the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963; Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Levitt 
& March, 1988). It has been intensively exploited in prior research on foreign growth of firms 
(e.g., Barkema et al., 1996; Delios & Henisz, 2003; Eriksson et al., 1997, 2000; Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002). An underlying assumption in these studies has 
been that while internationalizing, firms aim to reduce uncertainty. This reduction of 
uncertainty – or increase in confidence – has been said to occur thanks to firm’s knowledge of 
a foreign market, as well as its capabilities to operate and further expand in that particular 
market and in foreign markets in general (Barkema at al., 1996; Eriksson et al., 1997, 2000; 
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Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Hence, foreign growth has been seen as a learning process (cf. 
Cyert & March, 1963; Casson, 1994), where firms gradually improve their routines, increase 
their capacity to ‘absorb’ new (related) international experience, and become more competent 
and confident in their capabilities; this should allow them to expand successfully within 
countries where they have already established their presence and into gradually more 
‘psychically’ remote locations (Autio et al., 2000; Barkema et al., 1996; Chang, 1995; Cohen 
& Levinthal, 1990; Davidson, 1983; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). These ideas led prior 
research to conclude that international experience is valuable.  
Yet, recent evidence shows that 80% of sales of the world’s 500 largest multinationals 
(responsible for 90% of world’s stock of FDI) are only in their home region of North 
America, the European Union, and Asia ‘triad’ (Rugman & Verbeke, 2004). Apparently, even 
the most experienced companies do not maintain operations in a wide variety of countries. 
This observation underscores the idea that firms that rely on their experience when expanding 
abroad may face the issue of its applicability, i.e. the adequacy of its content relative to a local 
context (cf. Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Levitt & March, 1988). In fact, organizational learning theory 
suggests that different types of learning are likely to take place in stable and predictable 
environments, than in changing and unfamiliar environments. In the former case, repetitive 
actions of firms lead to routinization and desired efficiency gains. However, in changing and 
novel environments, in order to survive firms not only need to incrementally improve their 
routines, but also to ‘experiment’ so as to induce higher-level learning and develop new 
routines (Fiol & Lyles, 1985; March, 1991). This suggests that experience from one foreign 
market may not necessarily be transferable to another market (cf. Mitra & Golder, 2002). This 
also implies that experience gathered in one market under certain circumstances may be 
inapplicable to the same market when conditions in this market change. If firms erroneously 
generalize their experiences and apply them in novel investment situations or under changed 
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environmental conditions, negative performance outcomes are likely to follow (cf. Haleblian 
& Finkelstein, 1999).  
Prior literature suggests two plausible explanations for why such incorrect use of past 
experience may take place. First, competency traps and inertia are likely to occur (Levitt & 
March, 1988; Miller & Chen, 1994), in particular when the use of a certain routine has 
contributed to firm’s success over extended periods of time in the past. Prior successes 
reinforce organizational routines, and may lead to overconfidence and misapplication of past 
experience to novel investment situations. Second, superstitious learning may occur (Levitt & 
March, 1988), i.e. experience may be misapplied as a consequence of misinterpretation of or 
erroneous inferences from past events. Additionally, existence of slack resources within a 
firm, or risk reduction or empire-building ambitions of its managers (cf. Amihud & Lev, 
1981; Seth, Song, & Pettit, 2000), may encourage vigorous foreign expansion without 
sufficient attention being paid to actual competencies, which must be relied on while 
internationalizing. Absent relevant experience, the above may lead to misapplication of 
available experience, particularly when managers are overconfident in their capabilities 
and / or not aware that past experience may be inapplicable. 
 Still, even if the relevance of prior experiences is correctly discerned  (i.e. experiences 
are not used if they are not relevant), when faced with environmental changes or in novel 
investment situations firms may find themselves lacking adequate experience to rely on 
(Levitt & March, 1988). Moreover, firms may have to first ‘unlearn’ or forget their prior 
experiences before new routines and behavioral models can be developed and accepted (Bettis 
& Prahalad, 1995; Hedberg, Nystrom, & Starbuck, 1976; Huber, 1991). This may put them at 
a disadvantage with younger and inexperienced firms, for instance (Autio et al., 2000). Thus, 
organizational experience and the resulting routines, while helpful in general, may become a 
liability in changing or unfamiliar environments. 
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The above insights from the organizational learning theory suggest that the view 
traditionally held in the international business literature that prior experiences make firms 
more successful in expanding abroad within and across countries, requires refinement. 
Arguably, it is not only the abundance of international experience but also its adequacy 
relative to the environment (cf. Huber, 1991; Levitt & March, 1988) that matter for firms’ 
abilities to successfully expand into diverse foreign markets. If firms have abundant yet 
inadequate foreign experience that nevertheless reduces the uncertainty they perceive when 
investing abroad (cf. Davidson, 1983), it may leave them misleadingly confident in their 
capabilities, and increase the likelihood of failure (cf. Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). Thus, 
from the viewpoint of an internationalizing firm, it becomes critical to identify what sorts of 
international experience are indeed adequate (and valuable) when expanding into diverse host 
countries, and under what conditions.  
 
 
3.4. Theory and hypotheses  
 
A widely accepted benchmark for firm’s success nowadays is the ability of its leadership to 
create firm value as perceived by capital providers, analysts, media, etc. Hence, the central 
concern in the present study is the role of international experience as a key facilitator of 
value-generating international expansion, subject to environmental contingencies. When 
addressing this issue, below we delineate two relevant dimensions of the international 
experience concept, and account for three fundamental and much-studied features of the host 
country environments: the stability of policies, macroeconomic uncertainty, and cultural 
differences (cf. Zaheer, 1995).  
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3.4.1. Types of international experience 
International experience of firms is a primary source of organizational learning leading to 
reduction of uncertainty in the process of foreign growth (cf. Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; 
Penrose, 1995). It helps managers to understand local peculiarities, such as policies, economic 
conditions, culture, consumer needs and preferences, ways of dealing with local parties, etc. 
(Barkema et al., 1996; Li, 1995). Such knowledge, therefore, mitigates the problems typically 
arising from cultural, political, and economic differences, and other sources of ‘liability of 
foreignness’ (Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 1995). Local experience helps firms to obtain and absorb 
additional information, which in turn fosters efficient scanning for and selection of new 
valuable opportunities in this location. Hence, thanks to local experience, firms are not only 
able to operate efficiently in the focal market, but also to keep track of new developments and 
valuable opportunities there. Such a profound understanding of a market can be gained for 
example through interactions with local parties in the process of establishing and running 
multiple subsidiaries there, preferably over relatively long periods of time (cf. Ingram & 
Baum, 1997).  
Thus, when establishing a new foreign venture, a firm is likely to increase the wealth 
of its shareholders by leveraging its knowledge, capabilities, and routines in this venture, but 
also by being able to identify and exercise particularly valuable investment opportunities 
locally. This beneficial effect of prior presence in a market on value created with the new 
expansion is weaker, the lower the degree to which this venture resembles past experience, 
i.e., the less applicable past experience is, for instance because of obsolescence. Moreover, 
lacking adequate routines for doing business locally, managers are likely to search for new 
solutions in the neighborhood of what they know from prior expansions (Cyert & March, 
1963; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Levitt & March, 1988). Hence, the more novel the 
expansion event is (i.e., the more it diverges from what is recorded in the current experience 
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base of the firm and in the minds of its managers), the more difficult it becomes to find 
appropriate solutions for problems encountered locally and to run the new foreign venture. 
There may also arise a need to abandon prior routines before developing new solutions. From 
this perspective, past experience may become ballast for the firm. In such cases it is likely that 
the new expansion would divert the firm’s resources from other – potentially more productive 
– uses, and hence would not contribute to the value of the firm. 
Arguably, the extent to which a new investment event diverges from what is recorded 
in the current experience base of the firm depends on how well the firm knows the local 
environment, whether this environment is stable or turbulent, and how much experience the 
firm has with other, similar and dissimilar environments. Failure to generate value when 
expanding abroad may be not only due to the firm’s insufficient (or insufficiently related) 
experience, but also due to experience which is erroneously generalized and applied (Baum & 
Ingram, 1998; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). In this respect, organizational learning theory 
suggests that diverse experiences from a variety host of countries are helpful (cf. Barkema & 
Vermeulen, 1998). Diversity of experiences is likely to make internationalizing firms better 
aware of potential differences among host countries, for instance with respect to policies and 
macroeconomic conditions, their stability, as well as national cultures. This awareness can 
help managers avoid undue confidence, as well as misinterpretation and misapplication of 
their past experiences to those new investment situations to which these experiences do not 
apply. Diverse experiences may also be beneficial as they provide a basis for absorption and 
deployment of new knowledge, by increasing the likelihood that incoming information would 
relate to what the firm already knows (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Moreover, diverse 
experiences provide multiple starting points in the neighborhood of which the firm may 
search for solutions to problems encountered in a novel investment situation (cf. Cyert & 
March, 1963). 
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Finally, a broad experience base makes it more likely that a firm would not find itself 
tied down by its current set of host country specific competencies if a major change in the 
local environment occurred. For instance, a change in macroeconomic conditions, such as was 
the case for Central and Eastern European countries in 1989-1991, or a change in government 
policies, such as in the case of these countries upon their accession to the European Union, 
might invalidate some of the experiences and routines developed and used by foreign firms in 
those countries prior to the changes. In the situations above, post-change experiences from 
other countries in the region or from the ‘old’ European Union countries might be helpful to 
the foreign firms.  
The above discussion suggests that there are two distinct attributes of international 
experience underlying its structure (cf. Levitt & March, 1988) that are both needed in order 
for a firm to create value while internationalizing: the depth and the breadth. The depth of 
international experience results from repetitive actions and operations in a particular host 
country. It helps the managers to develop stronger routines applicable when doing business in 
the focal host country, and to scan the local environment for threats and opportunities more 
efficiently.  
The breadth of international experience, on the other hand, is built when a firm 
expands and operates in diverse as well as dynamically evolving environments. Arguably, 
experience from heterogeneous countries, or countries where the operating conditions change 
sufficiently to provide a firm doing business there with a range of diverse experiences, allows 
the firm to develop a better understanding of differences likely to occur across markets or 
types of countries. This makes the managers more likely to correctly judge which of the 
firm’s prior experiences can be used, and which should be disregarded, while expanding 
abroad (cf. Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). Hence, diversity of experience safeguards against 
misapplication of prior experiences to novel investment situations, i.e., it helps to discriminate 
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among the relevant and irrelevant experiences, when investing in multiple countries, but also 
when operating conditions in a focal country change substantially.  
In sum, we argue that the capability to distinguish the relevant experiences from the 
irrelevant ones is key to successful deployment of past experience in any new expansion, and 
therefore also key to successful, value-generating internationalization. Hence, the breadth of 
international experience is a desired complement to host country experience. Formally, we 
expect the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The depth of a firm’s experience in a host country relates positively to 
firm value created with a new expansion in the focal country. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The broader a firm’s international experience, the more positive is the 
impact of the depth of the focal country experience on firm value created with a new 
expansion in this country.  
 
3.4.2. Role of host country factors  
Our theory so far suggests that the effect of past experience on performance of 
internationalizing firms depends on the stability of and dissimilarities among host country 
environments. Indeed, host country specific factors are among the most studied determinants 
of foreign expansion performance. The differences between the home and the host countries 
are fundamental determinants of the liability of foreignness and the resulting challenges that 
managers of internationalizing firms face (Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 1995). The extent to which a 
country’s environment encourages foreign investors and promises high performance has been 
shown to depend on numerous factors, like macroeconomic conditions (Kwon & Konopa, 
1993), legal restrictions or trade barriers (Chang & Rozenzweig, 2001; Gatignon & Anderson, 
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1988), political risk (Delios & Henisz, 2003), and cultural differences (Barkema et al., 1996). 
We group these factors into three major categories: political hazards, economic risk, and 
cultural differences, and investigate their relationship with firm value created with new 
foreign ventures, conditional on international experience of firms, as discussed and 
hypothesized subsequently.  
 
Political hazards. Internationalizing into some countries involves more political risk for the 
expanding firms than into others. This may be due to a weaker institutional or legal 
infrastructure, an unstable or heterogeneous power base of the ruling political party, and other 
factors (Delios & Henisz, 2003; Henisz, 2002). In such countries, there is high likelihood that 
a major change in government policies may occur and invalidate a firm’s routines developed 
while doing business in the focal country under current policies. Irrespective of whether such 
policy changes would improve or deteriorate operating conditions in the focal country, past 
experience of the firm may turn (partly) irrelevant, and lead to negative performance 
outcomes if misapplied when further expanding in this country (cf. Haleblian & Finkelstein, 
1999). However, if managers of this firm developed an understanding of other politically 
hazardous countries, it is more likely that they will also understand the implications of policy 
changes in the focal country. As a result, the managers will correctly discern the relevance of 
their past experience. Moreover, they may rely on their relevant experiences from those other 
politically hazardous countries while expanding to the focal hazardous country. Hence, there 
is value to past (applicable) experience from other politically hazardous countries; the more 
so the riskier the focal country is. On the other hand, experiences from non-focal politically 
stable countries, if misapplied, may harm the value of a new expansion in a politically 
hazardous country. The higher the political hazards, the less applicable past experiences from 
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politically stable countries are, and the larger is the potential liability effect that such 
experience may have on firm value. Hence, we expect the following: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: The higher the political hazards of a focal host country, the more 
positive is the relationship between past experience from non-focal politically hazardous 
countries and firm value created with a new international expansion. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: The higher the political hazards of a focal host country, the more 
negative is the relationship between past experience from non-focal politically stable 
countries and firm value created with a new international expansion. 
 
Economic risk. Internationalizing firms may also be concerned with other sources of host 
country risk besides government policies: for instance, the fluctuations in and prospects for 
the macroeconomic conditions in that country (Miller, 1992). The economic performance of 
the country, access to capital markets, country debt indicators, inflation rate, exchange rates, 
etc., all impact the ways in which firms do business there. The macroeconomic factors 
influence purchasing power of consumers, growth and size of the focal market, availability of 
skilled and / or cheap labor, infrastructure, as well as the likelihood of strikes, social 
overthrows, etc. Economic risk taxes the value of the resources invested in the focal country, 
and may lead to devaluation of income generated in this country. A firm is likely to avoid 
these problems when it has sufficient knowledge regarding the focal economy (Hypothesis 1).  
Moreover, experiences from countries of similar macroeconomic stand as the focal 
country help the managers to correctly predict the implications of economic risk for the value 
of new expansions there, and to manage them more successfully. This is particularly valuable 
when there is much to lose, for instance when economic risk is high. On the other hand, past 
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experiences from economically stable countries, if misapplied to ventures into economically 
risky locations, may harm the shareholder wealth. Arguably, such potential misapplication is 
more harmful the larger the divergence between past experiences and current conditions in the 
host country, i.e. the higher the economic risk given the level of experience from 
economically stable countries. Hence, we predict the following: 
 
Hypothesis 4a: The higher the economic risk of a focal host country, the more positive 
is the relationship between past experience from non-focal economically risky countries and 
firm value created with a new international expansion. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: The higher the economic risk of a focal host country, the more 
negative is the relationship between past experience from non-focal economically stable 
countries and firm value created with a new international expansion. 
 
Cultural differences. Although a popular belief suggests that habits such as food, fashion, 
etc., are homogenizing across the globe (Levitt, 1983), both theory (Hofstede, 2001) and 
empirical evidence suggest that the underlying cultural traits (values, belief structures, etc.) 
are converging much more slowly, and that cultural differences are as destructive for foreign 
investments as ever before (Barkema et al., 1996; Li, 1995, Zaheer, 1995). Lack of knowledge 
of a local culture implies that the firm does not know what ‘works’ locally, for instance when 
interacting with local parties. This is particularly so if differences between the home country 
of the expanding firm and the host country are large in this respect. 
 Hence, firms internationalizing into culturally distant countries are likely to benefit 
particularly from prior experiences in those specific countries. They are also likely to find 
experiences from other similarly distant countries to be useful, regardless of whether these 
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distant countries are alike each other or not. This is because when operating in culturally 
remote locations, firms are likely to be aware of the potential cultural differences and their 
consequences for shareholder wealth possibly created with new expansions. Prior experience 
in other culturally distant countries also helps firms to discriminate between the experiences 
that should and should not be applied to a new expansion in another culturally remote 
country. The higher the cultural distance, the more valuable such capabilities are. Conversely, 
the higher the cultural distance, the less use there is of experiences from culturally proximate 
countries, and the more likely is the liability effect of these past experiences. Formally: 
  
Hypothesis 5a: The larger the cultural distance between the home and the host 
countries, the more positive is the relationship between past experience from non-focal 
culturally remote countries and firm value created with a new international expansion. 
 
Hypothesis 5b: The larger the cultural distance between the home and the host 
countries, the more negative is the relationship between past experience from non-focal 
culturally proximate countries and firm value created with a new international expansion. 
 
 
3.5. Methodology  
 
3.5.1. Sample  
To test the hypotheses, we collected data on foreign expansions of companies listed on the 
main segment of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. No data were gathered on expansions of 
financial institutions and the four largest firms (Royal Dutch Shell, Philips, Unilever, Akzo), 
as they differed considerably from the other firms in terms of scope of activities, size, as well 
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as international experience. Out of the remaining companies, 25 expanded abroad at least 
once over the sample period (1982-1998) and thus entered our sample. Two of these firms 
went bankrupt before 1998; hence, the sample should not suffer from survival bias. The 
companies were active in a wide variety of industries, for instance, the manufacture of paper 
and packaging, office equipment, pharmaceutical and chemical products, food products, 
brewing, retailing, trading and tank storage, and publishing and printing. Over the sample 
period, the average number of employees of these firms exceeded 14,000, and their average sales 
equaled EUR 2.160 billion. 
We collected data on all foreign ventures of these companies that were announced in the 
Dutch financial daily, Het Financieele Dagblad. In order to exclude pure portfolio 
investments from the analyses, the press releases were compared with lists of actively 
managed subsidiaries published by the sample companies in their annual reports. A total of 
592 foreign ventures recorded both in financial press and annual statements were identified. 
We then used the press announcement dates to measure value created by a parent firm with a 
new expansion, using the event study methodology. Disclosures of venture formations that 
coincided with announcements of other expansions of the same company (either on the 
previous, the same, or the next day) were excluded from analyses to avoid the distorting 
effects of contamination on the focal announcements. After accounting for missing data, the 
sample used to test the hypotheses was reduced to 425 observations. 
Next, in order to quantify international experience of the parent firms, data on their 
prior international expansions undertaken since 1966 were collected from their annual reports. 
We chose 1966 as the base year because it marked the beginning of a period of considerable 
foreign growth for the Dutch companies in the sample, and because older annual reports were often 
concise (i.e., lacking the required information) and / or difficult to obtain. Annual statements were 




In order to test the hypotheses concerning the firm value created upon international 
expansions, we employed a three-step methodology. In the first step, we used the event study 
approach to generate the dependent variable. In the second step, two sample selection 
correction terms were estimated in order to empirically account for the potentially 
endogenous choice between partly or wholly owned ventures as well as for selection of 
observations depending on availability of data needed to generate the dependent variable (i.e., 
for the fact that not all new ventures listed in annual statements of the sample companies were 
also announced in financial press). Finally, in the third step, we estimated a series of 
second-order regression models, in which we tested our hypotheses on the value created 
through new foreign ventures. Below we explain the three steps in more detail. 
 
Step 1: Event study. In order to obtain the dependent variable, i.e. firm value created through 
international expansion, we used the event study method. This approach (cf. Fama, 1976; 
McWilliams & Siegel, 1997) rests on the assumption of semi-strong stock market efficiency, 
i.e. it is assumed that changes in share prices around corporate announcements provide 
unbiased assessments of their economic consequences from the perspective of the company’s 
shareholders (Fama, 1976). The method (and the stock market efficiency assumption) has 
received extensive empirical support in finance literature (Fama, 1998; Malkiel, 2003), and 
has also been often used in strategy research (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997) as a tool to assess 
how firm value is influenced by strategic decisions. There is considerable evidence in prior 
literature that event study method has predictive validity; abnormal stock returns have been 
shown to correlate with both accounting-data based measures of performance and subjective 
managerial evaluations of success of strategic decisions (e.g., Healy, Palepu, & Ruback, 1992; 
Kale et al., 2002). Importantly, this method is conceptually superior to approaches taken in 
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those prior subsidiary-level studies that used for example manager satisfaction surveys or 
subsidiary survival analyses to quantify a foreign venture success. This is the case since the 
event study method allows us to capture how much additional (extra) value a new foreign 
venture creates for a firm, rather than how the venture performs on its own.  
Consistent with most prior research, we calculated abnormal returns using the market 
model (Fama, 1976; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). For each new expansion, we regressed the 
company’s daily stock returns on the benchmark Amsterdam Stock Exchange (AEX) index 
over a period of 121 trading days (approximately 6 months, from t = -136 to t = -16, where 
t = 0 was the announcement day of the new expansion in Het Financieele Dagblad).9 
Abnormal returns were calculated as a difference between returns predicted by the market 
model and share prices actually observed on focal trading days. In the regression analyses 
(Step 3), we used the cumulative abnormal returns over the days t = -1 and t = 0 as the 
dependent variable. This allowed us to account for potential early information arrival, for 
instance for expansions that were announced before the stock market closed on the day prior 
to the publication in Het Financieele Dagblad.  
 
Step 2: Generating corrective terms. On theoretical grounds alone, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that the host country determinants and firm specific factors simultaneously impact 
how many resources a firm commits to a new foreign venture as well as the value that this 
venture adds to the firm. To the contrary, managers in value-focused firms are likely to 
choose the amount of resources to be committed to a new market, based on the attributes of 
their firms (such as information and resource endowments) and on exogenous conditions. 
                                                 
9 For expansions from 1982, we used an AEX-equivalent index calculated by Datastream (our source 
of share prices and index data), since the AEX index was initiated only in 1983. Stock returns were 
adjusted for capital changes (e.g., stock splits, buybacks, regular capital issues, takeovers) and for 
dividend payments, and calculated in logarithmic terms to make the departure of daily data from 




This implies that the internationalization decisions taken by managers are endogenous to the 
expected outcomes. In other words, the choice of the extent of commitment to a market, for 
instance whether to own a part of or the entire foreign venture, is endogenously determined, 
and this endogeneity should be accounted for empirically to avoid biased estimates (Hamilton 
& Nickerson, 2003; Shaver, 1998).  
Another potentially problematic sample selection issue in our study may have to do 
with the fact that the number of the sample foreign ventures announced in financial press 
turned out to be substantially smaller than the total number of new subsidiaries listed in 
annual statements over the sample period; only 592 out of 1130 foreign ventures were 
announced in press. Moreover, due to methodological requirements, 104 observations were 
further excluded in the first step of the empirical analyses, as explained earlier.10 If there was 
a systematic reason why some of the foreign ventures were announced simultaneously 
(instead of one by one) in financial press or not announced at all in the course of the fiscal 
year (and only appeared- listed in the annual statements), the regression estimates might be 
biased.  
Therefore, two correction terms were generated. First, we estimated a classic probit 
model for the choice of partly versus wholly owned ventures. The probit model allowed us to 
quantify the likelihood that a new foreign venture is partly or wholly owned, conditional on 
the depth and the breadth of international experience of the focal parent firm, political 
hazards, economic risk, cultural differences, FDI restrictions (as reported by the International 
Monetary Fund), firm size and leverage, entry mode experience (measured as the count of all 
international partly and wholly owned ventures established by the sample firms prior to the focal 
entries), and firm-specific effects. Based on this model, we generated a sample selection 
correction term (λ) according to the procedure suggested by Shaver (1998, p. 581):  
                                                 
10 Further 63 observations dropped out of the analyses due to missing data on independent variables, 
resulting in a total usable sample of 425 foreign ventures. 
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λ = φ (β’X) / Φ (β’X) if the new expansion was wholly owned, and 
λ = - φ (β’X) / [1-Φ (β’X)] if the new expansion was partly owned, where 
 
φ was the density function, Φ was the probability distribution function, and β was the vector 
of parameters as listed above11 and including a constant term. This correction term was used 
as an additional explanatory variable in the third step of our analyses. 
Next, in order to assure the analyses are not biased as a result of selection on the 
dependent variable (cf. Greene, 2003; Heckman, 1979), we generated a second correction 
term, and also used it as an additional regressor in our models. This correction term was 
defined as Heckman’s lambda (Heckman, 1979), and based on a probit model for the 
probability of a foreign venture being individually announced in Het Financieele Dagblad (as 
opposed to not being announced there at all or being announced together with another venture 
or ventures). The explanatory variables were: the number of other expansions a parent firm 
had in the same year, the number of all prior foreign expansions, and two dummy variables 
capturing whether an expansion was partly or wholly owned, and whether it was a greenfield 
investment or an acquisition.  
 
Step 3: Models of firm value created through international expansion. In the third step of 
our analyses, we employed the cumulative abnormal returns as the dependent variable within 
a sample selection corrected, second-order regression framework (Aiken & West, 1991; 
Greene, 2003; Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003; Heckman, 1979). We used the White covariance 
matrix estimator to control for potential heteroskedasticity problems, and excluded 
                                                 
11 For more details on the exact operationalizations of the variables, see section 3.5.3. 
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observations contaminated with announcements of other ventures of the same company 
(either on the previous, the same, or the following day), as mentioned earlier.  
Our hypotheses on the value created with new foreign ventures were tested using 
simple and interactive terms in second-order regression models. Following suggestions of 
Aiken and West (1991), we mean-centered all continuous independent variables to avoid 
collinearity problems when using the interactive terms, and to facilitate interpretation of the 
estimated parameters. Still, substantial collinearity was present across the different interactive 
terms, and a reliable estimation of a complete model (testing all the hypotheses 
simultaneously) proved impossible. Hence, we tested the (sub-) hypotheses one by one (as 
reported in section 3.6) and in subsets (the results are available upon request).  
 
3.5.3. Independent variables 
Depth of host country experience refers to the intensity of a firm’s presence in a 
given host country (cf. Luo & Peng, 1999). We measured it as the number of subsidiaries the 
firm established locally since 1966 and prior to the focal entry.  
Breadth of international experience was measured as the number of countries the 
focal firm has ever operated in since 1966. This measure of the breadth of international 
experience differs from the geographic scope measures used in earlier studies (e.g., Hitt et al., 
1997; Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998) in that it accounts for parent firm experiences not only 
from countries where it currently operates, but also for experiences from abandoned 
geographic markets. 
Political hazards. We measured the probability of change in government policy of a host 
country using Henisz’ (2002) political hazards index (adjusted in such a way that high values 
implied high likelihood of change, and multiplied by 100). Consistent with our theory, Henisz’ 
time-varying index captures a rich set of characteristics of the institutional and political 
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environments of a particular country in a particular year. The index takes account of checks and 
balances imposed on local leaders and parties, in the form of independent judges and courts, veto 
power of legislative chambers, etc., to measure a nation’s ability to credibly commit to policies (see 
Henisz, 2002, for a more exhaustive description and calculation details). Hence, the measure 
captures host country political risk that is particularly relevant for foreign investors.  
 Economic risk of a host country was measured using the Euromoney magazine index, 
recoded in such a way that high values implied high risk. This index is based on factors such 
as economic performance of a country, access to bank lending, access to capital markets, debt 
indicators, discount on forfeiting, country credit rating, etc.  
Cultural differences between a host country and the home country (the Netherlands) of 
internationalizing firms were measured using the Kogut and Singh’s index (Kogut & Singh, 1988) 
based on the four dimensions of culture by Hofstede (1980, 2001), i.e. power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, individualism / collectivism, and masculinity / femininity. Additionally, sensitivity 
analyses using the Euclidean and the five-dimensional measures of cultural distance (including 
long-term orientation dimension; Hofstede, 2001) were conducted.  
Experience in non-focal politically hazardous / stable, economically risky / stable, 
and culturally remote / proximate countries. In order to operationalize these different 
aspects of non-focal host country experience, we first created a panel of more than 200 
potential host countries, covering the period of 1966-1998. Next, we computed the mean 
values of political hazards, economic risk, and cultural differences in each year, and compared 
the individual host country scores on each of these variables to these respective mean values. 
Countries that scored above their mean values on political hazards, economic risk, and 
cultural differences variables were coded as politically hazardous, economically risky, and 
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culturally remote, respectively. Countries that scored below the mean values were coded as 
politically stable, economically safe, and culturally proximate, respectively.12 
Next, we counted the number of foreign expansions that each of the parent firms 
undertook prior to the focal entry in the six different categories of countries, resulting in six 
pairwise-complementary measures of firm experience in non-focal host countries. Finally, we 
counted the numbers of countries in each of the six categories that each of the parent firms 
has ever expanded into prior to the focal entry, and used them as alternative measures of 
non-focal host country experiences.  
These two sets of measures (counting the number of prior ventures versus counting the 
number of countries previously expanded into in each of the six categories of countries) 
represent two extreme ends of a spectrum on which a practically relevant measure of 
experience should be. The assumption behind the first set of measures is that each expansion 
brings the same amount of experience to an internationalizing firm, and that the value of this 
experience remains constant over time. The assumption behind the second set of measures is 
that the first expansion into a country brings all possible experience from this country. The 
values that would realistically quantify firm experience are somewhere in between these 
extremes. Hence, we tested whether our hypotheses would hold for the two ‘extremes;’ if they 
did, they should also hold for any value in between them. 
Control variables. Since large firms may be more likely to fully own their new 
international ventures than small ones, and since the incremental value effects may be 
relatively small in large firms, we controlled for firm size, using the natural logarithm of the book 
value of the parent firm’s assets, expressed in thousands of Dutch guilders and adjusted for 
                                                 
12 The Euromoney magazine index of economic risk is available only as of 1982. Prior to this year, 
lacking other established measures, we used Goodnow & Hansz’ (1972) country risk clusters (cf. 
Gatignon & Anderson, 1988), and classified their medium and high-risk countries as economically 
risky, while their low-risk countries were classified as economically stable.  
Cultural distance index is constant over time, hence the coding of countries as culturally remote or 
proximate remains unchanged over time as well. 
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consumer price index changes. We also controlled for the firm’s financial leverage (measured as 
the ratio of total liabilities to assets), since it may affect the firm’s performance and ability to invest 
in new ventures (Jensen, 1986).  
Next, we took account of the fact that the effect of the announcement of the new foreign 
venture may be confounded by other news released by the parent company, which may also 
influence the stock price. Although such potentially confounding events should be controlled for to 
avoid potential biases resulting from the so-called (other) event-induced variance and event 
clustering (Brown & Warner, 1980), few studies in strategic management have actually done so. 
Hence, we proposed a crude yet tractable method to control for such possible effects. We 
distinguished between four qualitatively different types of potentially value-relevant 
announcements (and screened Het Financieele Dagblad issues from three weeks prior to and after 
the announcement date of the focal international expansion to determine whether these types of 
announcements had been made or not): profitability-related announcements (for example, profit 
warnings); announcements of other expansions; changes in the ownership of non-focal ventures; 
and more general strategy-related announcements. We then created dummy variables capturing 
whether a given type of announcement was made by the focal firm around the time when news 
about establishing a foreign venture appeared in financial press. The binary variable capturing 
confounding announcements of other expansions appeared statistically significant, and was the 
only one kept in our models as additional control variable. Finally, using firm dummy variables, 
we controlled for firm-specific effects.13  
The means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients of the variables are presented 
in Table 3.1.  
 
                                                 
13 In order to keep our models parsimonious, we included only those two firm dummy variables that 
appeared statistically significant.   
 
    
 
Table 3.1. Means, standard deviations, and correlations a 
  Meana S.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1 Abnormal returns .00 .02     
2 Depth of host country experience 5.81 8.26 .12     
3 Breadth of international experience 15.27 7.26 -.12 .07     
 Numbers of prior expansions in 
categories of non-focal countries:     
4 - politically hazardous countries 18.05 29.14 -.08 .35 .30     
5 - politically stable countries 25.34 20.79 -.13 -.16 .43 -.30     
6 - economically risky countries 8.49 7.80 -.08 .01 .90 .29 .26     
7 - economically stable countries 60.13 45.54 -.13 .34 .19 .75 .22 .06     
8 - culturally remote countries 6.63 6.29 -.05 .09 .87 .36 .34 .91 .21     
9 - culturally proximate countries 36.75 27.70 -.18 .24 .45 .78 .34 .30 .93 .42    
 Numbers of non-focal countries 
ever present in, in categories:      
10 - politically hazardous countries 3.58 2.91 -.05 -.03 .89 .21 .26 .92 -.02 .84 .23    
11 - politically stable countries 12.05 4.92 -.16 .15 .94 .35 .50 .77 .34 .78 .58 .70    
12 - economically risky countries 6.16 5.21 -.11 -.05 .91 .20 .26 .95 -.05 .84 .22 .92 .79    
13 - economically stable countries 9.47 3.36 -.11 .28 .70 .38 .55 .43 .55 .54 .70 .44 .83 .38    
14 - culturally remote countries 3.96 3.48 -.06 .02 .92 .24 .33 .90 .06 .93 .30 .92 .80 .92 .52    
15 - culturally proximate countries 11.67 4.36 -.17 .14 .92 .34 .47 .76 .32 .70 .56 .72 .96 .78 .81 .72    
16 Political hazards 59.33 14.68 -.02 -.02 .21 .03 .13 .20 .02 .20 .08 .21 .18 .22 .11 .24 .16    
17 Economic risk 12.21 14.67 -.05 -.36 .27 -.09 .18 .33 -.14 .28 -.03 .32 .18 .35 -.01 .30 .18 .24    
18 Cultural distance 2.42 1.01 -.10 -.16 .30 -.02 .25 .31 .01 .27 .10 .31 .26 .30 .17 .33 .24 .41 .38    
19 Firm size 13.54 .89 -.08 .20 .44 .33 .22 .30 .39 .33 .45 .32 .44 .29 .48 .37 .42 .19 .12 .10    
20 Leverage 1.99 1.74 -.03 .05 -.02 .04 .05 -.02 .09 .00 .08 -.05 .01 -.02 .00 -.06 .04 -.05 .11 -.02 .16   
21 Correction for selection on CAR .83 .31 .07 -.29 -.17 -.52 -.08 -.12 -.62 -.19 -.58 -.04 -.27 -.05 -.35 -.09 -.26 .01 .11 .02 -.32 -.12  
22 Correction for entry mode choice -.57 1.07 -.01 -.45 .20 -.27 .23 .23 -.26 .18 -.16 .27 .10 .27 -.05 .27 .07 .26 .49 .43 .15 .04 -.09 
a The mean values are for raw (non-centered) variables. Centering has no impact on standard errors and correlation coefficients.  




3.6.1. Hypotheses testing 
The results of the regression models are presented in Tables 3.2 through 3.5. Hypothesis 1, 
which implied that the depth of host country experience positively relates to the value created 
with new expansions in that country, was corroborated (Models 1 and 2, Table 3.2). Similarly, 
we found support for Hypothesis 2 (see Model 2 in Table 3.2), implying that the positive 
impact of the depth of host country experience on the value created with new foreign ventures 
is further reinforced by the breadth of the parent firm’s international experience.  
 
Table 3.2. Results of regression analyses of cumulative abnormal returns: The role of 
depth and breadth of international experience a 
Model 1 Model 2 
Depth of host country experience 5.94* (2.72) 4.48* (2.64)
Breadth of international experience  -3.25† (1.91)
Depth x Breadth  .53* (.31)
Political hazards .10 (.87) .23 (.86)
Economic risk -.03 (.72) .62 (.79)
Cultural distance -27.13* (11.38) -18.26 (11.19)
Firm size -30.30* (12.65) -23.11† (12.96)
Leverage -.64 (4.38) -.82 (4.17)
Correction for selection on the dependent variable 68.67 (42.49) 47.38 (42.18)
Correction for entry mode choice  
(partly versus wholly owned venture) 28.45
† (17.14) 21.21 (16.57)
Intercept 15.66 (38.65) 38.03 (38.95)
F-statistic 2.57** 2.53** 
R-squared .08 .10 
a N = 425. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Parameter estimates and standard errors 
are multiplied by 104. Significance levels are one-tailed for predicted effects and two-tailed 
otherwise. Statistically significant firm and confounding effect dummy variables are included but 
suppressed for reasons of space. 
          † p  <  .10 
     * p  <  .05 
   ** p  <  .01 
 
Our predictions regarding the role of past experience in the six types of host countries 
received partial support. No statistically significant coefficients were found with respect to the 
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Table 3.3. Results of regression analyses of cumulative abnormal returns: The role of 
experience in politically hazardous and stable countries a 
Model 3a Model 3b 
Numbers of prior expansions in categories of 
non-focal countries:     
- politically hazardous countries x Political hazards -.01 (.02)  
- politically stable countries x Political hazards -.01 (.03)  
- politically hazardous countries -.26 (.55)  
- politically stable countries -1.73** (.70)  
   
Numbers of non-focal countries ever present in, in 
categories:   
- politically hazardous countries x Political hazards  -.18 (.35)
- politically stable countries x Political hazards  .15 (.28)
- politically hazardous countries  10.78† (6.06)
- politically stable countries  -11.70** (3.97)
Political hazards .44 (.94) .27 (.82)
Economic risk -.42 (.77) -.52 (.80)
Cultural distance -15.37 (12.15) -16.37 (11.52)
Firm size -13.88 (13.49) -8.14 (13.12)
Leverage .79 (3.87) .54 (4.16)
Correction for selection on the dependent variable -3.86 (49.88) -26.62 (45.11)
Correction for entry mode choice  
(partly versus wholly owned venture) 4.64 (15.64) -3.02 (14.37)
Intercept 74.73† (43.72) 90.83* (40.57)
F-statistic 2.11** 2.50** 
R-squared .07 .07 
a N = 425. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Parameter estimates and standard errors 
are multiplied by 104. Significance levels are one-tailed for predicted effects and two-tailed 
otherwise. Statistically significant firm and confounding effect dummy variables are included but 
suppressed for reasons of space. 
          † p  <  .10 
     * p  <  .05 
   ** p  <  .01 
 
role of past experience in politically hazardous and stable countries for firm value created 
with ventures newly established in such countries (Hypotheses 3a and 3b, Models 3a and 3b 
in Table 3.3). 
The results presented in Models 4a and 4b (Table 3.4) suggested that past experience 
in economically unstable countries is particularly helpful when expanding into similarly risky 
locations. Experience from economically stable countries appeared to tax the value of new 
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Table 3.4. Results of regression analyses of cumulative abnormal returns: The role of 
experience in economically risky and stable countries a 
Model 4a Model 4b 
Numbers of prior expansions in categories of 
non-focal countries:   
- economically risky countries x Economic risk .09* (.06)  
- economically stable countries x Economic risk -.02† (.01)  
- economically risky countries -3.03† (1.76)  
- economically stable countries -.21 (.36)  
   
Numbers of non-focal countries ever present in, in 
categories:   
- economically risky countries x Economic risk  .21* (.10)
- economically stable countries x Economic risk  -0.33† (.25)
- economically risky countries  -5.65* (2.71)
- economically stable countries  -2.89 (4.15)
Political hazards .43 (.87) .55 (.87)
Economic risk -.90 (.82) -.77 (.85)
Cultural distance -19.70† (11.75) -17.54 (11.31)
Firm size -12.18 (13.95) -11.33 (12.98)
Leverage -1.17 (4.07) -1.53 (4.15)
Correction for selection on the dependent variable -3.30 (54.11) 2.58 (42.19)
Correction for entry mode choice  
(partly versus wholly owned venture) 2.24 (15.16) 3.89 (14.73)
Intercept 60.93 (47.33) 61.68 (38.81)
F-statistic 2.21** 2.16** 
R-squared .06 .07 
a N = 425. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Parameter estimates and standard errors 
are multiplied by 104. Significance levels are one-tailed for predicted effects and two-tailed 
otherwise. Statistically significant firm and confounding effect dummy variables are included but 
suppressed for reasons of space. 
          † p  <  .10 
     * p  <  .05 
   ** p  <  .01 
 
expansions, the more so the higher the economic risk, although the relevant statistical 
coefficients were only marginally significant. These results are in line with our expectation 
that in unstable environments, prior experiences may become a liability. An alternative, and 
consistent with our theory, interpretation of these results is that experience from stable 
countries has a more positive impact on firm value the more stable the economy of the host 
country is. This reinforces our point that the value of experience is contingent on its adequacy 
relative to the environment. Finally, Hypotheses 4a and 4b received support in models where 
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experience in non-focal countries was measured both as the number of prior expansions and 
the number of distinct countries expanded into prior to the focal entry. The hypotheses thus 
appeared to hold for both the extreme operationalizations of firm experience in non-focal 
countries, suggesting that the hypothesized effects should hold for values subject to weaker 
(more realistic) assumptions regarding learning from past experience as well.  
We also found that past experience from culturally remote locations is particularly 
valuable with increasing cultural distance between the home and the host countries (Models 
5a and 5b, Table 3.5). On the other hand, experience from culturally proximate countries has 
a negative impact on the value of new expansions in culturally distant locations. These results, 
supporting Hypotheses 5a and 5b, are also in line with the expectation that irrelevant 
experience may become a liability for internationalizing firms.  
Our insignificant findings with respect to the role of past experience in politically 
hazardous and stable countries for the value creation capabilities of new expansions in such 
countries (Hypotheses 3a and 3b) require further discussion. One reason for the lack of 
support for our predictions may be that Henisz’ (2002) measure of the likelihood of policy 
changes may confound changes which have positive and negative effects on firm value 
potentially created with a new foreign venture. While policy changes may be positive, an 
overthrow of the local government or ruling party might also imply that the operating 
conditions deteriorate as a result of policy adjustments. If such an unfavorable set of events 
indeed occurred, it might have forced the firm to withdraw from this market and ultimately 
prevent it from using its prior experiences in this country even if they did apply. This may 
further prevent the firm from identifying new valuable expansion opportunities locally. 
Hence, past experience from politically hazardous countries may be impossible to apply in 
particularly hazardous countries after a change occurs. Moreover, some past experiences from 
politically stable countries may in fact be applicable in politically hazardous countries as 
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Table 3.5. Results of regression analyses of cumulative abnormal returns:  The role of 
experience in culturally remote and proximate countries a 
Model 5a Model 5b 
Numbers of prior expansions in categories of 
non-focal countries:     
- culturally remote countries * Cultural distance 2.27* (1.06)  
- culturally proximate countries * Cultural distance -.51† (.34)  
- culturally remote countries -.75 (2.25)  
- culturally proximate countries -1.02 (.62)  
   
Numbers of non-focal countries ever present in, in 
categories:   
- culturally remote countries * Cultural distance  5.91* (2.84)
- culturally proximate countries * Cultural distance  -5.68* (3.02)
- culturally remote countries  4.66 (4.57)
- culturally proximate countries  -10.86** (3.83)
Political hazards .34 (.89) .45 (.85)
Economic risk -.83 (.78) -.50 (.79)
Cultural distance -17.06 (13.16) -16.53 (12.56)
Firm size -7.13 (13.69) -10.01 (12.19)
Leverage -.28 (4.08) 1.05 (4.09)
Correction for selection on the dependent variable -24.31 (50.58) -12.50 (41.49)
Correction for entry mode choice  
(partly versus wholly owned venture) -2.04 (15.15) -1.82 (14.47)
Intercept 74.42† (43.75) 79.16* (38.52)
F-statistic 2.52** 2.77*** 
R-squared .07 .08 
a N = 425. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Parameter estimates and standard errors 
are multiplied by 104. Significance levels are one-tailed for predicted effects and two-tailed 
otherwise. Statistically significant firm and confounding effect dummy variables are included but 
suppressed for reasons of space. 
          † p  <  .10 
     * p  <  .05 
   ** p  <  .01 
 *** p  <  .001 
 
defined using Henisz’ (2002) index. This may happen if policy changes are driving the focal 
(unstable) host country to become similar to other politically stable locations where the parent 
firm expanded in the past. This two-way effect of policy changes may explain our 
insignificant results. 
Another puzzling empirical finding is that experience in politically stable countries 
has a negative impact on abnormal returns upon new foreign venture formation, irrespectively 
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of the character of a host country (Models 3a and 3b). A similar pattern can be seen in Models 
4a and 4b, where the main terms of experience in economically risky countries appeared 
negative as well (still, here the interactive terms of experience measures with economic risk 
are statistically significant, thereby supporting Hypotheses 4a and 4b). Moreover, experiences 
across a range of politically hazardous countries appeared to have a marginally positive 
impact on firm value (Model 3b). These results may be due to the single home country 
research design of our study. The home country – the Netherlands – was itself economically 
and politically stable over the sample period. The sample Dutch multinationals invested 
mainly in other stable countries (compare the mean values of the different experience 
variables in Table 3.1). This might have left them insufficiently prepared for investments in 
less stable regions. This would explain why expansions into such markets might be 
disappointing for the stock market, as the data seem to indicate. Nevertheless, these intriguing 
results point to the need for further conceptual and empirical investigations into this issue. 
 
3.6.2. Additional analyses 
In order to assure robustness of the empirical results, we re-estimated our models using 
several additional control variables. First and foremost, three alternative measures of cultural 
distance were computed and used instead of the four-dimensional Kogut and Singh’s (1988) 
index: (1) a five-dimensional Kogut and Singh’s measure (with the long-term orientation 
dimension of culture accounted for); (2) a four-dimensional Euclidean index; (3) a five-
dimensional Euclidean index. Next, in order to account for the possibility that market size and 
potential determine firm value creation upon a new international entry, we controlled for host 
country GNP and the growth of GNP per capita. We also checked for the potential effect of 
business relatedness of new expansions, using a dummy variable equal to one if a subsidiary’s 
business was not related to the core business(-es) of the parent firm, and zero otherwise. All 
these additional analyses rendered results similar to the ones reported in Tables 3.2-3.5, yet 
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were based on smaller samples due to missing data (and therefore sometimes weaker than the 
ones reported here). Most of the hypothesized patterns received support in these analyses. 
 We also investigated potential time effects (using year dummies and an orthogonal 
fourth degree polynomial of a trend variable) and potential cultural region-specific effects 
(using nine cultural block dummy variables, based on classification proposed by Ronen & 
Shenkar, 1985, and supplemented with a class of post-communist countries not accounted for 
in their original study). Inclusion of none of the variables appeared to alter the earlier-reported 
results. Next, we recalculated the dependent variable using the Central Dutch Statistical 
Office (CBS) stock market index as a benchmark for estimating normal and abnormal returns, 
instead of the AEX index. The results were somewhat weaker than the ones presented 
eaerlier, yet most of the expected relationships were replicated. Finally, we re-estimated our 
models excluding the two sample selection correction terms. While the two correction terms 
were not statistically significant in any of the models (with the exception of the marginally 
significant entry mode choice correction term in Model 1), the other model parameters as well 
as model fit statistics were somewhat different. This is consistent with the idea that models 
estimated without accounting for potential endogenous sample selection may lead to biased – 
and hence, different – results.  
 
 
3.7. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Firms expanding abroad are confronted with a variety of operating environments and the 
associated complexity of managing their international activities. The changing and uncertain 
environments may invalidate the international experience firms rely on while 
internationalizing. This underscores the idea that international expansion is a hazardous 
process. Building on the behavioral theory of organizational learning, we took a closer look at 
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the role of international experience in the process of expansion into countries of diverse 
political, economic, and cultural backgrounds. We identified two dimensions of international 
experience: its depth and breadth. Most prior studies in the international business field 
focused on the first of the two and predicted its positive impact on firm performance and 
subsidiary survival. In contrast to this stream of research, we suggested that past experience, 
while generally helpful, might be a mixed blessing if it is not applicable in a new investment 
situation.  
The inapplicability of experience may result from its obsolescence due to shifts in the 
environment. Even if no major changes in the local environment took place, the new 
investment situation may substantially differ from those experienced previously, for instance 
with respect to political, economic, and cultural characteristics of the host country. In such 
cases past experience may turn irrelevant. Negative performance outcomes are likely if such 
irrelevant experiences are applied in new foreign ventures. This would imply that successful 
firms should not only be able to develop a base of international experiences, but also have the 
capability to distinguish relevant experiences from irrelevant ones. We claimed that broad 
experiences are likely to equip firms with this capability. Hence, we expected that 
international experience breadth makes firms less likely to misapply prior experiences, and 
therefore reinforces the positive effect of past (deep) experience on value creation potential of 
new foreign ventures.  
 Furthermore, we proposed that experiences from countries similar to the focal host 
country are particularly helpful, the more so the more demanding the local environment is. 
Building on prior literature, we broadly categorized countries as politically hazardous versus 
stable, economically risky versus stable, and culturally remote versus proximate. We 
predicted that the more challenging the local environment is – with respect to political or 
macroeconomic conditions, or cultural distance – the more valuable past experiences from 
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similarly challenging locations are. Such experiences endow firms with the right set of 
routines that can be readily used when expanding into a particularly demanding market. They 
are the more valuable the more challenging the new expansion appears to be. They also help 
firms to correctly apply or disregard past experiences in new investment situations. 
Conversely, past experiences from less demanding locations (i.e., stable in terms of policies 
and macroeconomic conditions, or culturally similar to the home market) are applicable in a 
limited set of countries. In the case of multinationals originating from the Netherlands or any 
other relatively stable (developed) country, as well as in the case of firms that never expanded 
into culturally remote locations, lack of experience from comparably challenging countries 
may prove particularly damaging when expanding there, as our theory and results imply.  
 These conjectures were tested using a three-step methodology. In the first step, we 
employed the event study method to generate the dependent variable, i.e. shareholder wealth 
created with new foreign ventures. In the second step, we computed two correction terms for 
potentially endogenous entry mode choice and sample selection on the dependent variable. 
Finally, eight second-order regression models explaining firm value creation were estimated. 
The results corroborated most of our predictions, while revealing areas in need of further 
investigations. 
The empirical results diverge from those reported in Delios and Henisz (2003), who 
hypothesized and found that prior experience in politically hazardous countries reduced the 
negative impact of political hazards on rates of FDI entry into a host country. They also found 
that low-hazards country experience had an increasingly negative effect on rates of FDI entry 
with higher political hazards. Assuming that firms tend to invest in countries where they are 
most likely to create value, our results should have paralleled those of Delios and Henisz 
(2003). Our insignificant findings could be explained with the nature of Henisz’ (2002) 
measure of political hazards, which captures the likelihood of (positive or negative) changes 
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in government policies, as discussed in section 3.6.1. Yet, if this held for our findings, it 
would also be true of results in Delios and Henisz (2003). If the Japanese firms in their 
sample expanded primarily into countries with negative policy change risk, this would explain 
the more pronounced significance of statistical coefficients in their estimations. The lack of 
convergence of our findings with theirs suggests that future research may benefit from 
distinguishing conceptually and empirically between positive and negative hazards related to 
policy changes.  
There is also a need to study the role of various aspects of international experience of 
firms originating from more than a single home country, specifically to compare firms 
originating from countries of diverse economic, political, and cultural backgrounds. Earlier 
literature explored whether national origin of firms may affect their ownership strategies 
when expanding abroad (e.g., Erramilli, 1996; Hennart & Larimo, 1998). Given that strategies 
translate into organizational performance, an interesting research question would be whether a 
firm’s country of origin affects the relative performance outcomes of different expansion 
strategies – such as incremental patterns of increasing commitment to foreign markets and 
expanding into gradually more ‘psychically’ remote locations, deemed most successful in 
prior research on staged internationalization (Barkema at al., 1996; Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977). For example, are firms originating from economically turbulent countries more likely 
to succeed when taking ‘larger’ internationalization steps than companies originating from 
stable economies? The theory proposed in our paper, while not dismissing the stages model of 
internationalization (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 1990), does suggest that an answer to the 
above question may be: yes. It also suggests that the success of stepwise internationalization 
strategies may be enhanced if firms pay attention to diversity of their international experience. 
It should protect them from false confidence, which may result from successful past 
expansions undertaken in an incremental manner, i.e., venturing into countries that did not 
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diverge much from what was recorded in the organizational experience base at the moment of 
entry. 
Building on prior literature that stressed the importance of organizational experience 
for performance, our paper proposed that it is the diversity of experience that helps firms to 
correctly apply or disregard past experiences when taking new strategic decisions (cf. 
Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). This argument parallels those of prior studies that proposed 
that strategically novel actions of firms (i.e., exploratory moves) spark higher-level 
organizational learning, and are beneficial to performance, at least up to a point (Barkema & 
Vermeulen, 1998; Eriksson et al., 2000; Fiol & Lyles, 1985; March, 1991). Our argument 
implies additionally that past exposure to strategic novelty is beneficial for firms’ ability to 
correctly use or disregard organizational routines.  
What we do not know, however, is how and what firms actually learn from diverse 
experiences, i.e. what the mechanisms of accumulating and interpreting diverse experiences 
are and how characteristics of the current experience bases of firms impact organizational 
learning from (and making sense of) diversity. In fact, the marginally negative relationship 
between experience breadth and firm value creation found in Model 2 (Table 3.2) suggests 
that firms may be unable to learn from (too) diverse experiences, for instance that they make 
erroneous inferences from them, or that they lack the absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990) to learn from them. Another explanation for this result can be that managers are not 
necessarily able to handle organizational complexity that results from diversity. Future 
research would benefit from clarifying these issues.  
We also do not know whether performance effects of learning from diversity are linear 
and stable over time. As long as the structure and content of experience are adequate relative 
to environments in which a firm operates, no non-linear effects of any aspect of experience on 
performance should be expected. Yet, we lack understanding of when experience is 
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adequately balanced and how to achieve such an optimal state if it existed. Perhaps this is not 
the structure of experience at any point in time that matters most; instead, the critical factor 
may be the process through which experience base developed over time (cf. Vermeulen & 
Barkema, 2002). We also do not understand how inter- and intra-organizational relations 
(networks) impact the nature of organizational experience. Finally, we do not know how 
experience ages, and how this process changes the ways in which experience is used in 
organizations. Are recent experiences more likely to be relied on even if older ones would be 
more relevant? These and other issues related to organizational experience need to be further 











In an attempt to reconcile prior inconsistent findings regarding the diversification-
performance relationship, we build on organizational learning theory to propose a process 
perspective on corporate expansion within and across industries. Industry-specific experience 
of firms and experience across industries are shown to be the bases of distinct yet 
complementary skills that help firms create value. Entries into unrelated (rather than core or 
related) businesses, and acquisitions (rather than greenfield investments), are predicted to be 
particularly valuable with increasing experience across industries. The converse is expected to 
hold for within-industry experience. Empirical tests render results that support most of the 






Corporate diversification and its relationship with organizational performance has been the 
subject of one of the longest academic debates in the fields of management and finance. Yet, 
both theoretical and empirical consensus on this relationship is lacking (Palich et al., 2000). 
Many scholars investigated the relationship between performance and the degree to which a 
firm is diversified (hereafter diversity) from a variety of theoretical perspectives. Empirically, 
they provided evidence for a positive, neutral, negative, and inverted U shape of this 
relationship (see Datta, Rajagopalan, & Rasheed, 1991, and Palich et al., 2000, for reviews). 
Another stream of literature in this area focused on individual diversification events, typically 
mergers or acquisitions (Montgomery, 1994; Penrose, 1995), in domains related and unrelated 
to core activities of focal firms. However, here too the empirical evidence is not unanimous 
(see Datta, Pinches, & Narayanan, 1992, and King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004, for reviews 
of research into acquisitions).  
Interestingly, although already Penrose (1995; first edition in 1959) described 
diversification of firms as one aspect of their growth process, only a small number of authors 
have since adopted a dynamic view on corporate diversification and diversity (Chang, 1996; 
Kim & Kogut, 1996; Markides & Williamson, 1996; Matsusaka, 2001; Teece, Rumelt, Dosi, 
& Winter, 1994). From the dynamic perspective, diversity is seen as an outcome of 
temporarily ordered, path-dependent decisions that managers take in their search for 
alternative courses of actions, as a response to specific problems or opportunities. In fact, it is 
not the diversity of firms per se that matters for their profitability and survival in the long run, 
but rather their abilities to establish wide ‘bases’ or ‘platforms’ from which they can adapt 
and extend their operations (cf. Kim & Kogut, 1996; Penrose, 1995). Such ‘platforms’ are 
developed over time and with experience, rather than assembled at a single point in time. 
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From this perspective, organizational experience and the resulting capabilities are seen as 
important determinants of how corporate portfolios may be successfully developed. Yet, it 
remains unclear what kinds of competencies firms need to expand within and across 
industries, and how these competencies can be developed.  
Our study aims to address this question by focusing on corporate histories of 
expansions within and across industries and firm value created in the process. This allows us 
to investigate what steps firms take on their diversification routes and what consequences 
prior steps have for firms’ capabilities to take subsequent steps successfully, i.e., to create 
value when doing so. We build on organizational learning theory to explain what firms may 
learn from taking such steps, and propose that firm value created as a result of corporate 
expansion within or across industries depends on the firm’s experience within the focal 
industry and its capability to correctly apply or disregard prior experiences from this and other 
industries (cf. Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). This capability, we argue, is fueled by diversity 
of past experiences of firms. Based on our theory, we further propose that greenfield 
investments and entries into industries related to the core activities of firms are particularly 
likely to create value with increasing within-industry experience. On the other hand, we 
expect expansions into unrelated businesses and acquisitions to be most likely to create value 
if firms have the capability to disregard inapplicable past experiences.  
 The contributions of this paper are two-fold. First, unlike most prior studies, we take a 
dynamic perspective to firm value creation through expansions within and across industries, 
and show how organizational experience within one industry may assist in successful growth 
in this industry and in other domains. Second, we focus on individual expansion moves and 
consider both acquisitions and greenfield investments as possible steps on diversification 
routes. This is in sharp contrast to the majority of prior research into individual expansion 
moves, which by design singled out internal development as possible means of growth within 
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and across industries. By looking at both internal and acquisitive growth, we attempt to find 
out which organizational experiences (and the resulting capabilities) help firms create 
relatively more or less value when expanding in one way or the other.  
The theoretical predictions were tested on a sample of 623 within- and across-industry 
expansions of 25 firms over a period of 26 years (1973-1998), using a 3-step methodology. In 
the first step, event study method was used to estimate how much shareholder wealth was 
created with a new corporate expansion. In the second step, we generated a corrective term for 
selection of observations based on availability and quality of data needed to compute the 
dependent variable. In the final step, second-order sample-selection corrected regression 
techniques were used to test the hypotheses. The empirical evidence corroborated some of our 





4.3.1. Diversity, diversification, and organizational performance  
Corporate diversification decisions are among the most important and visible moves a firm 
can make. It is therefore not surprising that much research has been done into how business 
diversity of firms – and their diversification moves – relate to organizational performance. 
Scholars investigated issues such as motives, costs, and benefits of diversity and 
diversification (e.g., agency problems, organizational complexity, availability of resources or 
opportunities, synergy effects, economies of scale and scope, risk reduction, financial 
benefits, market power changes, etc.), as well as diversification strategies (cf. Rumelt, 1982; 
Datta et al., 1991; Palich et al. 2000). A variety of theoretical perspectives were drawn upon, 
including the resource-based view of the firm (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Markides & 
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Williamson, 1996), transaction costs economics (Teece, 1982), agency theory (Amihud & 
Lev, 1985; Jensen, 1986; Shleifer & Vishny, 1989), market power perspective (Caves, 1981), 
cognitive theory (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995; Ginsberg, 1990; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), and real 
option perspective (Bernardo & Chowdhry, 2002). For the purpose of our study, we 
distinguished two main streams within this literature: one focusing on the relationship 
between diversity of firms and their performance, and the other focusing on individual 
diversification events, typically acquisitions, and their performance implications (see Datta et 
al., 1991, Datta et al., 1992; King et al., 2004; Martin & Sayrak, 2003; Montgomery, 1994, 
and Palich et al., 2000, for related literature reviews). 
Within the former stream of literature, based on a range of theories scholars derived a 
variety of hypotheses regarding the diversity-performance association. Empirical evidence for 
a positive, negative, neutral, and curvilinear shape of this link is abundant (Berger & Ofek, 
1995; Comment & Jarrell, 1995; Lang & Stulz, 1994; Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988; 
Palepu, 1985; Palich et al., 2000; Rajan, Servaes, & Zingales, 2000; Rumelt, 1982; 
Villalonga, 2004). One common characteristic of these studies is their ‘snapshot’ view on 
corporate diversity, with particular attention being paid to contingencies for performance of 
certain (types of) firms at certain points in time. It was shown, for example, that the diversity-
performance relationship varies over time (Grant & Jammine, 1988; Lubatkin, Srinivasan, & 
Merchant, 1997; Martin & Sayrak, 2003; Mayer & Whittington, 2003; Montgomery, 1994), 
with firm- or industry-specific characteristics (Bettis & Mahajan, 1985; Campa & Kedia, 
2002; Delios & Beamish, 1999; Grant & Jammine, 1988; Van Oijen & Douma, 2000), as well 
as contextual factors (Makino, Isobe, & Chan, 2004; Mayer & Whittington, 2003). Also, 
geographic scope of firms was shown to play an important role in their ability to benefit from 
business diversity (Geringer, Tallman, & Olsen, 2000; Hitt et al., 1997; Tallman & Li, 1992; 
Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). In short, it appears that performance implications of corporate 
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diversity depend on the conditions under which it is attempted. However, also the way in 
which diversity is achieved, or the individual steps that companies take on their 
diversification routes, may play an important role in explaining firm performance and value 
creation (cf. Penrose, 1995).  
The second major stream of literature we distinguished in this paper provides some 
insights into this very issue. So far, its primary focus has been on mergers and acquisitions 
(Montgomery, 1994). In this body of research, the most commonly submitted and supported 
hypothesis is that – thanks to synergies, economies of scale and scope, potential for building 
on and sharing existing resource and knowledge, etc. – related acquisitions and 
non-conglomerate mergers are more successful than unrelated acquisitions and conglomerate 
mergers, respectively (Flanagan¸ 1996; Flangan & O’Shaughnessy, 2003; Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999; Maquieira, Megginson & Nail, 1998; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990; 
Pangarkar & Lie, 2004; Pennings et al., 1994). However, there are also studies whose authors 
postulated and / or provided empirical evidence for a negative or inverted U-shaped 
relationship between target firm’s relatedness to the bidder firm and performance outcomes of 
acquisitions, in terms of firm value creation, innovativeness, and survival (Ahuja & Katila, 
2001; King et al., 2004; Matsusaka, 1993; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001).  
Theory and evidence regarding internal diversification moves, in particular when 
compared to acquisitive growth, is scarce. This is especially striking when we consider that 
many firms expand internally into familiar as well as relatively novel areas, through 
exploitation and recombination of their existing capabilities (cf. Penrose, 1995). While 
diversifying expansions are more likely to be carried out through acquisition than through 
greenfield investment (Hennart & Park, 1993), exclusive reliance on a single mode of 
expansion within and / or across industries may restrict performance (Busija, O’Neill, & 
Zeithaml, 1997; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). Yet, we lack understanding of performance 
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consequences of internal growth within and across industries. In this respect, a few notable 
exceptions are studies by Chatterjee and Singh (1999), Lamont and Anderson (1985), 
Pennings et al. (1994), and Simmonds (1990). They provided arguments and some evidence 
regarding preference of firms for different modes of diversification (Chatterjee & Singh, 
1999), and performance outcomes of (related) internal expansion over (unrelated and / or) 
acquisitive growth (Lamont & Anderson, 1985; Pennings et al., 1994; Simmonds, 1990). 
However, little agreement exists among these studies with respect to performance 
implications of expansions within and across industries by means of internal development and 
acquisition. Hence, there is a need for further research into firm value implications of both 
modes of diversification.  
One common characteristic of studies in the stream of literature on individual 
diversification moves is their treatment of corporate expansions as isolated events. Yet, in 
reality, such events – and their impact on corporate performance – are not independent of 
other events in corporate history, in particular other expansions within and across industries 
(cf. Côté, Langley, & Pasquero, 1999; Kim & Kogut, 1996; Teece et al., 1994). In fact, 
organizations must be grown, and the way they grow matters for their performance (Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1997, Penrose, 1995). Building a successful corporation requires that the 
decision-makers not only know what they should aim for (i.e., what extent of corporate 
diversity, if any, is performance-optimal), but – perhaps more importantly – how to reach this 
point (i.e., what steps on corporate diversification routes are particularly valuable). In essence, 
this is a question of how successful organizations build their business portfolios over time. In 
order to address this question, a dynamic perspective on expansions within and across 




4.3.2. Dynamic perspectives on expansions within and across industries  
From the early days of research into performance consequences of corporate expansion, 
researchers adopted a process perspective (cf. Penrose, 1995). However, it has not been until 
much more recently that a dynamic perspective on diversification-performance relationship 
was proposed. In their pioneering work, Prahalad and Bettis (1986) suggested a cognitive 
explanation for the link between diversification and performance. They noted that it is not 
necessarily the diversity of firms that matters for their performance per se, but that the quality 
of managerial skills, ability to acquire new skills, and the current ‘dominant logic(s)’ used by 
managers when expanding within and across industries are key. The dominant logics of 
managers and organizations are their conceptualizations of businesses and learned problem-
solving and decision-making behaviors (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). These conceptualizations 
and behaviors are determined by past experience and the resulting organizational routines 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982). Over time and with new experiences, managers and organizations 
learn, search for new solutions, and amend their dominant logics and routines through 
feedback (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995; Chang, 1996). This in turn affects their subsequent 
capabilities to expand into novel and familiar businesses, in close proximity of core activities 
of firms and further away, by means of greenfield investment and acquisition. 
 In a similar vein, Kim and Kogut (1996) observed that firms diversify and adapt by 
learning, within the constraints imposed by their past experiences and current capabilities. 
From this perspective, corporate expansion within and across industries can be viewed as an 
“evolution of a stock of experiential knowledge that provides a platform by which to enter 
related fields” (Kim & Kogut, 1996, p. 292; Penrose, 1995). As firms expand, they add 
activities that typically relate to some aspects of their current activities and experience 
repositories (Teece et al., 1994; Penrose, 1995; Van Kranenburg, Cloodt, & Hagedoorn, 
2001). This path-dependence of corporate expansions within and across industries is due to 
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the cumulative nature of organizational learning, which imposes constraints on what firms can 
do and learn. Importantly, when resources and experience bases of firms differ, what firms 
learn from their new expansions may also differ, and the value of this information will not be 
the same for different firms either (Bernardo & Chowdhry, 2002; Foss & Christensen, 2001). 
This implies that certain steps on diversification routes that are successful in the case of one 
firm may prove futile or even destructive in the case of another one, even if perfectly 
replicated (Nachum, 2004). In fact, firms are likely to create value if they choose businesses 
that match their capabilities well (Matsusaka, 2001; Penrose, 1995). Yet, it is not impossible 
that firms improve their performance when expanding into unrelated fields, too (Markides & 
Williamson, 1996; Matsusaka, 1993). Indeed, diversified expansion is particularly likely to be 
undertaken and improve profitability of a firm when the firm’s existing markets do not grow 
fast enough to fully utilize its productive capabilities, and superior opportunities arise outside 
of these markets (Penrose, 1995). So far, however, it remained unclear what capabilities firms 
need in order to be able to realize the benefits of their growth potential and create value when 
expanding within and across industries. In what follows we take the organizational learning 
perspective to develop a theory and hypotheses addressing this issue.  
 
 
4.4. Theory and hypotheses  
 
From the organizational learning perspective (cf. Cyert & March, 1963; Fiol & Lyles, 1985; 
Levitt & March, 1988), corporate expansion within and across industries can be seen as a 
learning process, where firms gradually improve their routines (cf. Nelson & Winter, 1982) 
and become more competent and confident in their capabilities to expand into familiar as well 
as novel, related or unrelated, businesses (cf. Markides & Williamson, 1996; Penrose, 1995). 
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This learning process is firm-specific and path-dependent. Past experiences of firms form the 
bases of their routines, dominant logics, and knowledge, which in turn frame managerial 
decisions and are inform subsequent learning and adaptation. In this sense, prior experiences 
restrict the area in which decision-makers search for new investment opportunities to that of 
‘past solutions’ (Cyert & March, 1963), such as for example industries or ‘specialization 
areas’ (Penrose, 1995) already represented in firms’ experience repositories. However, these 
current routines and dominant logics do not preclude managers from coincidental discoveries 
of investment opportunities in novel and / or unrelated business areas, which hold a promise 
of superior profitability and value creation. In what follows, therefore, we propose a 
distinction between expansions into areas ‘related’ to core activities of firms and those 
‘unrelated,’ where ‘unrelated’ entries are defined as leading to “increases in the number of 
‘basic areas’ of production in which a firm operates,” consistent with Penrose (1995, p. 109). 
We discuss the nature of these two different types of expansion and conditions for their 
successful implementation, depending on past experiences of firms.  
Expansions into businesses related to core activities of a firm represent relatively 
small, ‘coherent’ (cf. Teece et al., 1994) steps on firms’ diversification routes. Such steps are 
taken with reference to a current dominant logic a decision-maker relies on, a logic which is 
largely shaped by the core activities of the firm (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). With each ‘small 
step,’ the firm essentially replicates some aspects of its prior expansions; therefore, when 
doing so, the firm can rely on and possibly improve its current routines. This makes the firm 
more likely to succeed with the new expansion move. Moreover, the better the managers 
know a given business domain, the more likely they are to identify superior investment 
opportunities in this domain, for example particularly attractive acquisition targets. Thus, in a 
path-dependent way, prior expansions within a given business domain provide the kind of 
experiences and understanding of the focal industry that allow the managers to select and 
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successfully exercise superior investment opportunities. At the same time, however, such 
experiences may impose constraints on organizational search for new opportunities outside of 
the core domains.  
Continued expansions involving exploitation of an existing, industry-specific set of 
routines, while possibly leading to refinements of these routines, may also constrain the firm’s 
capabilities to develop new skills and successfully amend their business portfolios (cf. Fiol & 
Lyles, 1985; Kogut & Zander, 1992; March, 1991). Therefore, long-term survival of firms 
requires that they not only refine their routines, but also recombine elements of their 
knowledge and explore new knowledge (cf. Kogut & Zander, 1992; March, 1991). By 
injecting new knowledge or renewing it through recombination, firms can offset potential 
inertia and lockup problems. In practical terms, as most organizational learning occurs by 
doing, firms need to take both small, coherent steps on existing diversification routes or in 
close proximity of those routes, as well as expansion steps of a more exploratory character 
(cf. March, 1991; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). Such exploratory investments may broaden 
and refresh the current experience bases of firms. Some of these steps may lead to initiation of 
new lines of business, which may eventually become core domains and take over the roles of 
other, possibly less profitable businesses, in corporate portfolios.   
The outcomes of these exploratory, ‘large steps,’ i.e. expansions into businesses 
unrelated to core activities of firms that break rather than exploit the current organizational 
routines, are systematically more uncertain than the outcomes of the incremental, internally 
consistent ‘small steps.’ Returns from the ‘large steps’ are also more distant in time and 
organizationally more remote from the locus of action than the ‘small steps’ (cf. March, 
1991). Therefore, firms are more likely to make mistakes when embarking on such 
routine-breaking expansions. Initially, they may not only have little experience to rely on, but 
also face the need to unlearn or abandon some of their past routines before developing new 
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ones (Bettis & Prahald, 1995). Yet, some experiences from areas other than the one where a 
firm chooses to expand may assist in undertaking such an exploratory expansion, as well as in 
learning from it (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Indeed, when taking such a ‘large step,’ a firm 
may be able to make some use of its existing routines and knowledge, for instance through 
‘transplantation’ of experiences from those areas remote from its core activities that in some 
way resemble the current investment situation, but also through recombination of elements of 
organizational wisdom from a set of past experiences (cf. Kogut & Zander, 1992; Penrose, 
1995). Thus, from the viewpoint of firms expanding within and across industries, it is critical 
to identify what sorts of organizational capabilities and experiences indeed help them to create 
value when expanding within and across industries. 
 
4.4.1. Organizational experience  
Managerial and organizational experiences are the primary inputs into the process of 
developing corporate routines and management logics on which firms rely when expanding 
within and across industries. Experience in establishing and running businesses in a given 
industry helps managers to understand the peculiarities of this industry, for example 
characteristics of customer or supplier bases, prevailing trade practices, technical and 
regulatory aspects, competitive pressures, etc. Prior ventures established in this (and related) 
domains can also help the firm to build a network of connections, alliances, and so on, all of 
which may lead to efficiency gains. A well-established industry actor is also in a superior 
position to identify and quickly exercise new investment opportunities. Finally, past industry 
experience implies that the new expansion relates to some aspect of prior activities of the 
firm, thereby resulting in a more ‘coherent’ and cognitively ‘related’ diversification move (cf. 
Teece et. al., 1994). This leads to the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1: The larger a firm’s experience in a given industry, the higher the firm 
value created with a new expansion. 
 
Within-industry experiences are typically fairly homogenous; the kinds of customers 
and suppliers a firm learns to deal with, the regulatory or competitive pressures, etc., are all 
the same within a given industry. Even though substantial changes may take place as 
industries evolve over longer periods of time, within-industry experiences are unlikely to 
provide the firm with the range of diverse routines and multiple logics it may need to be able 
to survive in the long run (Markides & Williamson, 1996; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). 
Continued positive performance feedback on past actions within a familiar homogenous 
setting may leave the firm not only inert (cf. Hannan & Freeman, 1977), but also unable to 
identify threats and opportunities that arise outside of this setting (Miller & Chen, 1996). 
Narrow experience may also leave the firm’s competitive advantage eroded as a result of 
competitive pressures, such as for example imitation by other firms (Markides & Williamson, 
1996). Even if managers of such a narrowly experienced firm coincidentally spot a novel 
investment opportunity in an unfamiliar setting, they may misapply their prior industry 
experiences to this novel opportunity. This may lead to negative performance outcomes 
(Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Levinthal & March, 1993). In the long run, when the 
narrowly experienced firm exhausts its opportunities within the given industry and is not able 
to renew itself, its performance is likely to decline.  
All these problems are likely to be avoided if firms possess heterogeneous, 
cross-industry experiences. Such experiences may help firms to build multiple sets of routines 
which they can rely on when scanning industries remote from their core activities for new 
opportunities and threats. This will make them not only more likely to spot particularly 
valuable opportunities outside of their core businesses, but also more likely to succeed when 
attempting to exercise them. Furthermore, cross-industry experiences may also be beneficial 
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as they provide a basis for absorption and deployment of new knowledge, by increasing the 
likelihood that incoming information would relate to what the firm already knows (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990). Broad experiences also increase the likelihood that new useful combinations 
of knowledge will be made (cf. Kogut & Zander, 1992; Markides & Williamson, 1996). Past 
experiences particularly closely resembling the current investment situation may also be 
transferred and routines ‘transplanted’ to this situation (Penrose, 1995).  
Finally, cross-industry experiences of firms, rather than simply the diversity of their 
current activities, are likely to endow firms with the kind of knowledge they need to be able to 
correctly apply or disregard their past experiences (cf. Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Teece, 
1982). The correct use of prior knowledge requires that managers distinguish between 
investment situations which are similar to earlier experienced ones along certain dimensions, 
and situations that are novel along at least one of these dimensions. Diversity of experiences 
is likely to make firms better aware of potential differences among industries, for instance 
with respect to characteristics of customer or supplier bases, trade practices, competitive and 
regulatory pressures, etc. This awareness can help managers avoid undue confidence, as well 
as misinterpretation and misapplication of their past experiences to those new investment 
situations to which these experiences do not apply. Thus, we argue that cross-industry 
experiences encourage appropriate use of organizational routines (cf. Levinthal & March, 
1993). 
The above discussion suggests that cross-industry experience can help firms generate 
value when diversifying. It also suggests that such experience is a desired complement to and 
a hedge against potential negative consequences of narrow within-industry experience of 
firms. Hence, we expect the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The larger a firm’s experience across industries, the higher the firm 
value created with a new expansion. 




Hypothesis 3:  The larger a firm’s experience across industries, the more positive is 
the impact of the firm’s experience in a given industry on firm value created with a new 
expansion.  
 
4.4.2. Small and large steps 
Our theory so far suggests that depending on how distant a new investment is from core 
activities of a firm, different skills and capabilities may prove particularly valuable. The 
‘small steps,’ i.e., expansions into areas closely related to core businesses of firms, have an 
exploitative character. Firms rely on their past experience and routines both when identifying 
opportunities for expansions into industries related to their specialization areas, and when 
actually undertaking them. This implies that the value of ‘small steps’ is particularly high 
when firms have much experience within the industry in question.  
Conversely, when a firm takes a larger step, i.e., expands into an industry that is 
unrelated to its core activities, it will initially be constrained in its abilities to transfer and 
apply the current (dominant) routines to this new business. At the outset, there will be little 
overlap between what is represented in the firm’s management dominant logic(s) and what 
may be needed to run the new business. These capabilities will need to be developed over 
time and through experience (but also – possibly – through adaptation and / or recombination 
of routines the firm might have developed and used in its operations in business areas 
‘remote’ from core activities of firms). Early experiences on a new diversification path 
initiated after the firm took a ‘large step’ need to be interpreted and put into reusable form of 
routines before they can indeed help the firm to take a subsequent step on this path. However, 
if such new diversification path is followed further, over time and with subsequent expansions 
within the focal domain, the organizational experience base as well as the locus of 
specialization are likely to evolve. More expansions within the industry in question will 
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signify increasing importance of this industry to the firm, and may lead to the development of 
a new dominant logic. Should this happen, later steps on the diversification path will no 
longer be considered ‘unrelated’ expansions. The industry will be becoming more and more 
core to the firm, and new expansions within this industry will be more and more closely 
related to what is core to the firm. With more steps taken on this path, the firm’s experiences 
will also become easier to reuse. The value of new expansions will then increase with within-
industry experience of the firm. Formally: 
 
Hypothesis 4a: Firm value created with a new expansion increases with the firm’s 
experience in the given industry more strongly in the case of a related rather than an 
unrelated business entry. 
 
While ‘large steps,’ i.e., unrelated expansions, may be difficult to take and to generate value 
from, some firms are successful when doing so (Markides & Williamson, 1996; Matsusaka, 
1993; Penrose, 1995). Through the organizational learning theory lens, we would expect that 
these are the heterogonous, cross-industry experiences that help firms create value in such 
situations. Diverse experiences make a firm less likely to misapply past experiences, which is 
particularly important in novel investment situations, such as after a ‘large step’ on a new 
diversification route. Experiences across a range of industries may lead the firm to develop 
multiple sets of routines, which increases the likelihood that a ‘large step’ will not be as 
remote from what is recorded in the organizational experience base as in the case of narrowly 
experienced firms. This increases the likelihood that the firm will be able to ‘absorb’ and 
learn from such a new experience quickly (cf. Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Broad experiences 
may also result in a large number of possible recombinations of pieces of organizational 
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knowledge derived from these past experiences, thereby increasing the potential set of 
information which the firm may rely on when expanding into unrelated fields.  
Conversely, experiences across a variety of industries will not play such an important 
role in the case of expansions closely related to core activities of the firm, i.e. ‘small steps.’ In 
the case of a ‘small step,’ the firm is likely to have sufficient knowledge and well-established 
routines applicable to the industry in which it is expanding. This knowledge makes the firm 
less reliant on experiences from outside of this industry. Therefore, the firm is less likely to 
use and potentially misapply any of such outside-industry experiences. This makes the diverse 
experiences relatively less important in the case of expansions into industries related to core 
activities of firms as compared to unrelated expansions. Hence, we expect the following: 
 
Hypothesis 4b: Firm value created with a new expansion increases with the firm’s 
experience across industries more strongly in the case of an unrelated rather than a related 
business entry. 
 
4.4.3. Greenfield investments and acquisitions 
Another dimension along which diversification steps may differ is their mode. Similarly as 
expansions in close proximity to core activities of a firm (i.e., ‘small steps’), its greenfield 
investments have an exploitative character. When expanding through internal development, 
the firm essentially transfers, applies, and replicates some of its routines and competencies, in 
an efficient way. Greenfield investments are especially valuable if the firm’s industry-specific 
knowledge and technological assets are tacit and specialized, the more so if they form the 
basis of a core competence (and competitive advantage) of this firm (cf. Barkema & 
Vermeulen, 1998; Hennart & Park, 1993). A business domain is particularly likely to be a 
source of the core competence the more expansions the firm had in this industry prior to the 
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focal entry. In this case, internal expansions are most likely to contribute to firm value the 
more experience the firm has in the business domain in question. With increasing 
within-industry experience, the firm also becomes better capable of expanding on its own, as 
it does no longer need to rely on – typically difficult to integrate and manage – acquisitions as 
means of obtaining relevant knowledge. Long-term presence in an industry also implies that 
investment decisions can be planned with greater certainty and spread over time, which 
mitigates the fast-entry advantage of acquisitive growth.  
Unlike greenfield investments, acquisitions share some of the exploratory features of 
‘large steps’ on new diversification paths, and are particularly suitable for expansions into 
novel and unrelated industries. When expanding by means of acquisition, firms can 
substantially reduce the managerial and technical difficulties of entering a new industry 
(Penrose, 1995), as they may acquire technological capabilities as well as experienced 
management team, who understand the peculiarities of their industry. Thus, acquisitions may 
offer an efficient and fast way to refurbish firms’ portfolios and to grow, in particular in early 
stages of expanding along a new diversification path, substituting for internal development.  
However, in later stages, when industry-specific capabilities of firms become strong, 
the difficulties inherent in integrating target firms will become more pronounced (Barkema & 
Vermeulen, 1998), while the advantages of acquisitive growth will diminish. The very 
features that make acquisitions attractive as means of obtaining knowledge and experience 
early in the process of expansion into a new business domain – their inherent heterogeneity – 
makes them more difficult to handle as compared to internal expansions, and hence relatively 
less attractive in later stages. This is also because misapplication of prior experiences is more 
likely in the case of acquisitive growth than greenfield investments (cf. Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999). Thus, cross-industry experiences are particularly helpful when expanding 
by means of acquisition. 
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For all the above reasons, we expect that with increasing within-industry experience, 
firms will be relatively more likely to create value when expanding by means of internal 
development rather than acquisition. Conversely, there will be additional value to past 
experiences across industries in the case of expansions by means of acquisition, as compared 
to greenfield investments. Formally: 
 
Hypothesis 5a: Firm value created with a new expansion increases with the firm’s 
experience in the given industry more strongly in the case of an internal development rather 
than an acquisition. 
 
Hypothesis 5b: Firm value created with a new expansion increases with the firm’s 
experience across industries more strongly in the case of an acquisition rather than an 
internal development.  
 
 
4.5. Methodology  
 
4.5.1. Sample  
To test the hypotheses, we collected data on expansions within and across industries of 
companies listed on the main segment of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. No data were 
gathered on expansions of financial institutions and the four largest firms (Royal Dutch Shell, 
Philips, Unilever, Akzo), as they differed considerably from the other firms in terms size, 
international experience, and scope of activities, leaving 25 companies. The companies were 
active in a wide variety of industries. Over the sample period, the average number of employees 
of these firms exceeded 12,000, and their average sales approached EUR 1.7 billion.  
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We collected data on all expansions of these companies within and outside of their core 
businesses. This information was originally sourced from lists of actively managed 
subsidiaries published by the sample firms in their annual reports and from announcements 
they made in the Dutch financial daily, Het Financieele Dagblad. We carefully compared 
press releases with annual statement data in order to exclude pure portfolio investments from 
the analyses. A total of 968 new expansions recorded both in financial press and annual 
statements were identified. We then used the press announcement dates and changes in stock 
prices around them to measure firm value created with new expansions, using the event study 
methodology. Disclosures of expansions that coincided with announcements of other venture 
formations of the same company (either on the previous, the same, or the next day) were 
excluded from analyses to avoid the distorting effects of contamination on the focal 
announcements. After accounting for these necessary exclusions and any missing data, the 
sample used to test our hypotheses was reduced to 623 observations. 
Next, in order to quantify within- and cross-industry experience of the parent firms, 
data on all their prior expansions undertaken since 1966 were collected from their annual 
reports. We chose 1966 as the base year because it marked the beginning of a period of 
considerable growth for the Dutch companies in the sample, and because older annual reports were 
often concise (i.e., lacking the required information) and / or difficult to obtain. Annual reports 
were also the source of accounting data used in the analyses.  
 
4.5.2. Analysis 
In order to test the hypotheses concerning firm value created with a new expansion, we 
employed a three-step methodology. In the first step, we used the event study approach to 
generate the dependent variable. In the second step, we computed a sample selection 
correction term to empirically account for potential selection of observations depending on 
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availability and quality of data needed to generate the dependent variable. If not accounted 
for, such selection might have led to biased results in our final models, which we estimated in 
the third step. More specifically, we ran a series of second-order regressions, in which we 
tested our hypotheses on firm value created through expansions within and across industries. 
Below we explain the three steps in more detail. 
 
Step 1: Event study. In order to obtain the dependent variable, i.e. firm value created with a 
new expansion, we used the event study method. This approach (cf. Fama, 1976; McWilliams 
& Siegel, 1997) rests on the assumption of semi-strong stock market efficiency. Thus, we 
assume that changes in share prices around corporate announcements provide unbiased 
assessments of their economic consequences from the perspective of the company’s 
shareholders (Fama, 1976). In line with our theory and hypotheses, the use of event study 
method allows us to capture how much additional value a firm creates when taking a step on a 
diversification route.  
Consistent with most prior research, we calculated abnormal returns using the market 
model (Fama, 1976; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). For each new expansion we regressed the 
company’s daily stock returns of each of the sample firms on a benchmark index over a 
period of 121 trading days (approximately 6 months, from t = -136 to t = -16, where t = 0 was 
the announcement day of the new expansion in Het Financieele Dagblad). The benchmark 
chosen for this study was the Amsterdam Stock Exchange (AEX) index. Since AEX index 
was only initiated in 1983, stock prices around announcements of expansions from the 1973-
1982 part of the sample period were regressed on AEX-equivalent index calculated by 
Datastream, our source of stock market data.14 Abnormal returns were calculated as a 
                                                 
14 Stock returns were adjusted for capital changes and dividend payments. The returns were calculated 
in logarithmic terms to make the departure of daily data from normality less severe (Fama, 1976). 
Similarly, the benchmark index returns were in logarithmic form. 
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difference between returns predicted by the market model and share prices actually observed 
on focal trading days. In the regression analyses (Step 3), we used the cumulative abnormal 
returns over the days t = -1 and t = 0 as the dependent variable. Thus, we accounted for 
potential early information arrival, for instance for new expansions that were announced 
before the stock market closed on the day prior to the publication in Het Financieele Dagblad.  
 
Step 2: Correcting for potential sample selection problem. On theoretical grounds alone, 
we cannot dismiss the possibility that our sampling procedure resulted in a set of observations 
not fully representative of the sample firms’ expansions. In fact, from annual reports we 
identified as many as 1975 new ventures set up over the sample period. Only about half of 
them (968) were announced in financial press. 190 of those were contaminated 
announcements, and hence could not be used in the empirical analyses.15 If there was a 
systematic reason why some of the expansions were announced simultaneously (instead of 
one by one) in financial press or not announced at all in the course of the fiscal year (and only 
appeared listed in the annual statements), the regression estimates might be biased as a result 
of sample selection on the dependent variable (cf. Greene, 2003; Heckman, 1979).  
Therefore, we generated Heckman’s correction term (Heckman, 1979), and used it as 
an additional regressor in our models. The term was based on a probit model for the 
probability of a new expansion being individually announced in Het Financieele Dagblad (as 
opposed to not being announced there at all or being announced together with another venture 
or ventures). The explanatory variables were: the number of other expansions a parent firm 
had in the same year, the number of all prior international expansions, the number of all prior 
domestic expansions, and three dummy variables capturing whether an expansion was partly 
                                                 
15 Additional 145 observations could not be used due to missing data, mainly stock prices – a 
particularly problematic issue in the beginning of our sample period – and information on business 
relatedness of new expansions.  
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or wholly owned, whether it was a greenfield investment or an acquisition, and whether it was 
international or domestic.  
 
Step 3: Models of firm value created with new expansions. In the third step of our 
analyses, we employed the cumulative abnormal returns as the dependent variable within a 
sample selection corrected, second-order regression framework (Aiken & West, 1991; 
Greene, 2003; Heckman, 1979). The model parameters were estimated using a modified OLS 
regression procedure, where we controlled for potential heteroskedasticity problems using the 
White covariance matrix estimator, with an additional adjustment for within-group 
dependence of observations in the sample (the ‘cluster’ procedure, StataCorp, 2001). This 
allowed us to account for firm-specific effects. Our hypotheses on the value created with new 
expansions were tested using simple and interactive terms. Therefore, following suggestions 
of Aiken and West (1991), we mean-centered all continuous independent variables. This 
allowed us to mitigate collinearity problems typically arising when interactive terms are 
estimated, and facilitated interpretation of model coefficients. Thanks to mean-centering, the 
estimated coefficients showed directly how a given variable related to abnormal returns at 
mean levels (rather than zero values) of other mean-centered variables involved in a given 
interaction. Collinearity problems were not present in our models, as indicated by all variance 
inflation factors being well below the 10 cut-off point, and average values of these factors not 
exceeding 2.7 in any of the models. 
 
4.5.3. Independent variables 
Within-industry experience of a firm was measured as the number of subsidiaries the 
firm established within a particular industry since 1966 and prior to the focal entry. We 
defined industries as unique 3-digit SBI codes (the Dutch equivalent of SIC codes).  
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Experience across industries was measured as the number of unique 3-digit SBI 
codes the firm has ever been active in since 1966 and prior to the focal entry. Consistent with 
our theory, this measure explicitly accounted for parent firm experiences not only from 
industries in which it operates currently, but also for experiences from industries no longer 
represented in the business portfolio.  
Related and unrelated expansions. Expansions within and across industries were 
coded as either related or unrelated based on their business relatedness with core activities of 
the sample firms, as defined in their annual reports and confirmed by sales and revenues data. 
Hence, the set of core activities of each parent firm was allowed to change over time. We 
created a dummy variable equal to one for unrelated entries, and zero otherwise, where 
unrelated entry was neither in the same 2-digit SBI-code category as core activities of the firm 
nor within the value-added chains of these core activities. This operationalization is in line 
with the ‘basic areas’ notion of Penrose (1995, p. 109), and the ‘dominant logic’ concept of 
Prahalad & Bettis (1986), where unrelated expansions are those in a new ‘basic area’ and 
those that cannot be served by the current dominant logic of the firm (which in its turn is 
shaped by core activities of the firm). 
Greenfield investments and acquisitions. To capture the mode of expansion within 
and / or across industries, we created a binary variable equal to one when the expansion was 
undertaken by means of acquisition, and zero otherwise. Relevant information was sourced 
from annual reports and financial press releases.  
Firm-specific control variables. Since large firms may be more likely to fully own 
their new ventures than small ones, and since the incremental value effects may be relatively 
small in large firms, we controlled for firm size, using the natural logarithm of the book value of 
the parent firm’s assets for the year prior to the year of the focal expansion, expressed in thousands 
of Dutch guilders and adjusted for consumer price index changes. We also controlled for the firm’s 
Expansions within and across industries 
 
 103
financial leverage (measured as the ratio of total liabilities to assets), since it may relate to the 
firm’s performance and ability to invest in new ventures (Jensen, 1986), in particular when 
diversifying (Mansi & Reeb, 2002). Next, we controlled for the firm’s profitability, using the return 
on equity ratio (ROE), as availability of resources may explain why a firm expands within and 
across industries (cf. Campa & Kedia, 2002; Jensen, 1986).  
Much prior research stressed the importance of multinational diversity and experience of 
firms for their ability to benefit from business diversity (e.g., Geringer et al., 2000; Hitt et al., 
1997; Tallman & Li, 1992; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). Therefore, we controlled for within- and 
cross-country experiences of firms, as well as their interaction. Within-country experience was 
measured as the number of entries a firm made into various businesses in a given country since 
1966 and up to a year prior to the focal entry. Experience across countries was a count of the 
number of countries a firm has ever been active in since 1966 and up to a year prior to the focal 
entry (compare Chapter 3).  
Finally, as explained earlier, potential systematic firm specific-effects were accounted for 
through the use of clustering estimation procedure (StataCorp, 2001). 
Expansion-specific control variables. Using binary variables, we controlled for two 
key characteristics of new entries studied in this paper. First, to capture potential systematic 
differences in value-creation capabilities of partly versus wholly owned subsidiaries, we used 
joint venture dummy variable, which was equal to one if the focal entry was partly owned by 
the parent firm, and zero otherwise. Second, to account for possible differences in value of 
expansions within the Netherlands and abroad, we used international entry dummy variable, 
which was equal to one if the focal entry was outside of the Netherlands, and zero otherwise.  
Other control variables. As firm value creation upon expansions within and across 
businesses may change over time (cf. Montgomery, 1994), we included year dummy variables 
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in our models. Finally, as explained earlier, Heckman’s lambda to correct for potential sample 
selection on the dependent variable was included.  
The means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients of the variables are presented 





4.6.1. Hypotheses testing 
Estimation results are presented in Table 4.2. Hypothesis 1, which predicted that 
within-industry experience helps firms to create value when expanding in this domain, was 
directly tested in Model 1. It received substantial empirical support, also in other models 
reported in Table 4.2. Similarly, our data corroborated Hypothesis 2, which implied that when 
expanding within and across businesses, firms create more value the more experience across 
industries they have. We also found support for Hypothesis 3, in which we postulated that 
experience across industries reinforces the positive impact of within-industry experience on 
firm value created with new expansions.  
Hypotheses 4a and 4b were tested in Models 2 and 3, respectively. Consistent with our 
theory, the estimate of the interactive term between within-industry experience measure and 
dummy variable for unrelated expansion appeared significantly negative (p < .05, Model 2), 
suggesting that within-industry experience of firms is relatively more valuable in the case of 
expansions into businesses related to their core activities than into unrelated areas. We did not 
find empirical support for Hypothesis 4b (Model 3; the interactive term of experience across 
industries with unrelated entry dummy variable), implying that firm experience across 
industries is equally valuable in cases of entries into businesses related to core activities of 





Table 4.1. Means, standard deviations, and correlations a 
  Mean S.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Abnormal returns .003 .022   
2 Within-industry experience 14.645 15.610 .017   
3 Experience across industries 12.892 6.189 .003 -.153   
4 Unrelated expansion .128 .335 -.021 -.190 .053   
5 Acquisition .856 .352 .018 -.072 -.089 .021  
6 Firm size 13.376 .861 -.035 .128 .434 -.045 -.121  
7 Leverage .582 .391 .011 .012 -.014 .056 .026 .166  
8 ROE .177 .129 .000 .377 -.189 .089 .133 -.048 .016  
9 Within-country experience 12.568 16.299 -.016 .047 .188 .211 .123 .054 -.056 .082  
10 Experience across countries 14.846 7.133 -.095 .207 .314 -.027 -.181 .424 -.032 -.098 .006  
11 Joint Venture .353 .478 -.033 .021 .029 -.013 -.442 .098 -.020 -.175 -.155 0.101  
12 International expansion .750 .434 .052 .152 -.053 -.133 -.079 .099 .054 .113 -.721 0.149 .071  
13 Sample selection correction term .614 .226 -.029 .201 .246 .048 .431 .258 .035 .306 .046 0.167 .072 .300 
a The mean values are for raw (non-centered) variables. Centering has no impact on standard errors and correlation coefficients.  
 
  
Table 4.2. Results of regression analyses of cumulative abnormal returns a  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Within-industry experience .95* (.50) 1.11* (.49) 1.03* (.48) 3.37*** (.94) .95* (.50) 3.53*** (.95) 
Experience across industries 4.00** (1.35) 4.09** (1.37) 4.52** (1.42) 3.98** (.24) 3.14† (2.02) 4.06* (1.95) 
Within x across industry experience .15* (.08) .17** (.09) .11† (.08) .11† (.07) .15* (.08) 0.09 (.08) 
Within-industry experience  
x Unrelated expansion  -2.74* (1.33)    -2.33* (1.28) 
Experience across industries 
x Unrelated expansion   -8.21 (6.44)   -7.47 (6.56) 
Within-industry experience  
x Acquisition    -2.93** (1.15)  -2.86* (1.21) 
Experience across industries  
x Acquisition     1.14 (2.54) .62 (2.40) 
Unrelated expansion -9.22 (28.64) -30.80 (21.86) -2.25 (31.53) -10.97 (28.19) -9.36 (28.75) -23.01 (27.09) 
Acquisition 74.00† (41.90) 74.11† (42.29) 73.73† (41.61) 75.53† (39.85) 73.39† (42.36) 75.01† (40.45) 
Firm size .51 (8.78) -0.29 (8.84) -.48 (9.12) -.39 (8.44) .65 (8.70) -1.87 (8.65) 
Leverage 8.59 (17.50) 10.28 (17.31) 9.62 (17.42) 11.12 (17.93) 8.14 (17.68) 13.19 (17.83) 
ROE 41.81 (70.87) 36.96 (69.71) 24.03 (68.04) 49.78 (73.28) 43.86 (71.44) 30.42 (70.21) 
Within-country experience .86 (.92) 1.04 (.92) .86 (.92) .89 (.91) .85 (.93) 1.03 (.92) 
Experience across countries -3.77** (1.11) -3.92*** (1.10) -3.96*** (1.11) -4.01*** (1.05) -3.81** (1.10) -4.33*** (1.04) 
Within x across country experience .16* (.06) 0.15* (.06) .17* (.06) .16* (.06) .16* (.06) 0.17* (.06) 
Joint Venture 24.51 (25.09) 25.75 (25.59) 25.34 (25.70) 23.77 (25.60) 24.88 (24.83) 25.81 (26.45) 
International expansion 78.57† (41.14) 85.40† (41.94) 78.04† (40.62) 78.70† (40.65) 78.53† (41.25) 83.99† (41.35) 
Sample selection correction term -180.3** (55.34) -181.2** (56.57) -183.1** (53.65) -173.3** (53.71) -180.5** (55.01) -176.82** (52.91) 
Intercept (7395)† (3800) 7568† (3804) 8063* (3812) (7050)† (3926) 7455† (3765) 7845† (3884) 
Time dummy variables  Included Included Included Included Included Included 
F-statistic 65.39*** 52.07*** 41.51*** 137.27*** 124.69*** 698.62*** 
R-squared    .06    .06    .06      .07      .06      .07 
a N = 623. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering (firm-specific effects) are in parentheses. Parameter estimates and standard errors are 
multiplied by 104. Significance levels are one-tailed for predicted effects and two-tailed otherwise.  
        † p <  .10       * p <  .05       ** p <  .01      *** p <  .001 
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 We tested Hypotheses 5a and 5b in Models 4 and 5, respectively. The significantly 
negative interactive term between within-industry experience construct and ‘Acquisition’ 
dummy variable in Model 4 indicated that such experience is relatively more valuable when 
firms expand through internal growth rather than acquisitive growth. This is in line with 
Hypothesis 5a. We failed to find support for Hypotheses 5b, which predicted that broad 
industry experiences should be relatively more valuable in the case of expansions by means of 
acquisitions rather than greenfield investment (Model 5; the interactive term of experience 
across industries with ‘Acquisition’ dummy variable). We also estimated a full model (Model 
6), which corroborated earlier results, however now the effect implied by Hypothesis 3 fell 
just outside of the 10% significance level (p-value equaled .12). 
It is worthwhile noting that in none of the models unrelated expansions appeared to 
create systematically less value than related expansions, as indicated by the insignificant 
coefficients by unrelated expansion dummy variable. This is in contrast with much prior 
research but consistent with our theory, which suggested that both ‘small steps’ and ‘large 
steps’ may prove valuable, provided the parent firm has the right set of experiences on which 
it can rely when expanding within and across industries. 
 
4.6.2. Additional analyses 
An underlying assumption behind our current measure of firm experience across industries is 
that each past entry into a new industry brings equal amount of usable knowledge to the firms. 
An opposite extreme would be to assume that only industries that are currently represented in 
firm’s portfolios bring usable experiences. While realistic values of experience across 
industries are somewhere in between these two extremes, a reliable measure is difficult to 
construct. Therefore, we conducted sensitivity analyses, using an alternative measure of 
experience across industries, in which we counted the number of unique 2-digit SBI codes 
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firms were active in, in the year prior to the year in which the focal expansion was 
undertaken. Additional analyses provided results analogous to those obtained using our core 
measure of experience across industries, with Hypothesis 2 now only marginally supported, 
and Hypothesis 3 unsupported, however. This suggest that these are more likely past 
experiences from all industries ever expanded into, rather than experiences from industries 
currently present in, that matter for firm capabilities to correctly apply or disregard past 
experiences and create value when expanding again. An alternative and consistent with our 
theory interpretation of these findings is that this is not the scope of current activities that 
matters for firm capabilities to create value when expanding within and across industries, but 
the combined industry scope of past and current experiences. This underlies the importance of 
considering corporate histories when investigating the diversity-performance relationship. 
 We also conducted additional analyses using non-linear measures of experience within 
and across industries. Quadratic and cubic effects were not present, and we did not observe 
diseconomies of scale and scope in our sample. Next, we used logarithmic forms of the two 
experience variables. Apart from Hypothesis 1, all previously reported results were replicated, 
albeit at lower significance levels. This may suggest that the value of additional units of 
within-industry experience is not subject to diminishing returns from experience in our 
sample. Even though two of the sample firms went bankrupt within the window of analysis, 
what we may witness in fact in this sample is successful management of business portfolios, 
where firms stop expanding into or even abandon industries where they see no superior 
opportunities any longer. Another explanation may be that – even if decreasing – the 
incremental improvements in routines that result from additional units of within-industry 
experience bring about efficiency gains in more and more subsidiaries of the firm. This may 
explain the observed linear rather than non-linear impact of within- and cross-industry 
experiences on the value of the sample firms.   
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Since organizational form may foster or inhibit the benefits from expansions within 
and across industries (cf. Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004; Markides & Williamson, 1996), we 
expanded our models to include binary variables through which we distinguished among 
sample firms adopting divisional, geographic, and matrix structures. Organizational structure 
effects were statistically not different from zero, other results remaining virtually unchanged.   
 Next, we considered potential impact of firm entry mode experience on value created 
when expanding by means of greenfield investments and acquisitions. If capabilities to 
expand internally versus through acquisitions were important determinants of firm value 
creation when expanding within and across industries, our results might be biased due to the 
omitted variable problem. Therefore, we measured parent firm experiences with start-ups and 
acquisitions prior to the focal entries by counting the number of past greenfield expansions 
and acquisitions the firms undertook prior to the year of the focal entry, respectively. We 
included these measures as additional regressors in our models, and the estimates appeared 
insignificant, other results remaining unchanged.  
 We also tried an alternative way to control for time-specific effects. We generated a 
trend variable (a year count) and its 4th degree orthogonal polynomial, which were then used 
as control variables in our models. While trend effects appeared unimportant determinants of 
firm value, empirical support for our hypotheses remained unchanged. Furthermore, as firm 
value creation may depend on external conditions, we run alternative models controlling for 
the wealth and growth rate of country-of-entry, using GNP per capita and its growth rate as 
proxies. We also created a dummy variable equal to one if an entry was into a developed 
country, as opposed to developing or transitional one (coded as zeros). Additional analyses 
did not qualitatively change the support for our hypotheses received originally, while 
reducing sample size due to missing data.  
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 Finally, we took account of the fact that firm value effect of a new expansion 
announcement may be confounded by other value-relevant news released by the firm. We 
distinguished among four qualitatively different types of such potentially value-relevant 
announcements, and screened Het Financieele Dagblad issues published three weeks prior to and 
after the announcement date of the focal expansion to determine whether these types of 
announcements had been made or not. The types of announcements were the following: 
profitability-related announcements (for example, profit warnings); announcements of other 
expansions; changes in the ownership of non-focal ventures; and more general changes in strategy. 
We then created dummy variables capturing whether a given type of announcement was made by 
the focal firm around the time when news about establishing a new venture appeared in financial 
press. Subsequently, three of these dummy variables were included in our models as additional 
control variables. None of the confounding effects proved statistically significant, other results 
remaining qualitatively unchanged.  
 
 
4.7. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Expansions within and across industries are part of every-day business of many firms striving 
for survival in the globalizing and increasingly more competitive world. Hence, much 
research in a variety of theoretical traditions has been done into what level of business 
diversity translates to good performance. Yet, relatively little attention has been paid to 
individual expansion moves by means of greenfield investments and acquisitions. In this 
paper, we took organizational learning perspective to propose a theory on what helps firms 
create value when expanding within and across industries.  
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 Building on the idea that diversification of firms should be regarded as a learning 
process in which a firm develops and subsequently deploys appropriate routines and operating 
logics, we proposed that the value of individual diversification moves depends on the firm’s 
abilities to (1) identify and successfully exercise superior investment opportunities; and (2) 
correctly apply (or disregard) its past experiences when doing so. This led us to hypothesize 
that past experiences within the focal industry and across a variety of industries are 
particularly valuable, the more so if in combination with each other. Furthermore, we argued 
that different types of organizational experience are relatively more or less valuable for 
different types of steps firms may take on their diversification routes. ‘Small steps’ 
(expansions into businesses related to core activities of firms) and greenfield investments 
were expected to be particularly valuable with increasing experience of firms in the focal 
industries. Conversely, ‘large steps’ (unrelated expansions) and acquisitions were predicted to 
result in most additional value if firms had much prior experience across industries.  
Our predictions were tested using a three-step methodology. In the first step, we 
employed the event study method to generate the dependent variable, i.e. shareholder wealth 
created with expansions within and across industries. In the second step, we used an 
estimation procedure suggested by Heckman (1979) in order to account for potential sample 
selection on the dependent variable. Finally, six second-order regression models explaining 
firm value creation were estimated. The results corroborated most of our predictions, while 
revealing areas in need of further investigations. 
In particular, we failed to support Hypotheses 4b and 5b, in which we expected 
cross-industry experience to be particularly valuable for unrelated (rather than related) 
expansions and for acquisitions (rather than greenfield investments), respectively. The logic 
underlying these hypotheses was that expansions of a rather exploratory character, such as 
entries into unrelated businesses and acquisitions, might lead to negative performance 
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outcomes. We argued that due to the novelty and heterogeneity of such expansions, past 
experiences are more likely to be misapplied than in cases of related industry entries or 
greenfield investments. An alternative logic would be that broad experiences across industries 
provide multiple possibilities to recombine existing elements of organizational knowledge to 
create new elements (cf. Kogut & Zander, 1992). This may be particularly helpful when 
expanding into novel fields (where little past experience is available to rely on) and / or 
through internal growth (where it is difficult to generate new knowledge by other means). It is 
likely that these two effects – the risk of misapplication of past experience and the chance for 
new knowledge creation through recombination – are at work simultaneously. This may lead 
to no clear advantages of one type of expansion over another with increasing experience 
across industries. Future research into these issues may prove fruitful.  
Consistent with our theory, but unlike in many prior studies, we found no systematic 
differences in value creation capabilities of related versus unrelated expansions. While the 
former are more certain and more likely to succeed, the latter may have relatively higher 
option value for firms, which may result in – on average – comparable value of the two types 
of steps on diversification routes. There may also exist important contingencies for value 
creation capabilities of new expansions into related and unrelated industries. In this paper, we 
discussed one set of such contingencies: parent firm experience in the focal industry and 
across industries. Future research may investigate other potentially important contingencies, 
for example related to organizational capabilities, such as capabilities to undertake and 
manage related and unrelated expansions, but also contingencies pertaining to characteristics 
of new ventures.  
Perhaps these are specifically the features of new expansions – in combination with 
parent firm capabilities – that may lead to value creation or destruction. In the context of 
international growth, it was shown that expansions involving single- rather than 
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double-layered acculturation are more likely to be successful (Barkema et al., 1996). In the 
context of firm growth within and across industries, a third layer of acculturation may be 
involved, where international acquisitions or joint ventures in unrelated businesses would be 
considered most difficult to handle, while domestic wholly owned and internally developed 
expansions in related businesses – the least difficult. It remains an open question what the 
value-optimal combinations of venture characteristics would be. 
 Another intriguing question that remains unanswered is what happens after firms 
initiate new diversification paths. Our theory implies that after initial trials on a new path, a 
firm’s managers should be able to judge the path’s value-creation potential and either choose 
to follow this path or abandon it. Should they choose to expand further along this track, a 
now-unrelated business may soon become a related or even a core activity of the firm. 
Exploratory analyses of our data reveal that, over time, some initially unrelated industries 
become related to core activities of firms, and some related become core themselves, while 
others are abandoned. This suggests that core activities of firms evolve over time and with 
organizational experience, such that some industries represented in corporate portfolios 
appear closer and closer to what constitutes core activities of the firms, while other industries 
become less important (cf. Van Kranenburg et al., 2001). Hence, as current performance of 
firms reflects their past decisions, the relationship between their business diversity and 
performance may in fact depend on the past evolution of their portfolios and business ‘cores.’  
Evolution of corporate portfolios promises to be an interesting avenue of future 
research. For example, we lack understanding of how new core businesses emerge, how firms 
enter and exit industries (cf. Chang, 1996), how this relates to their performance, etc. We also 
do not understand how corporate performance depends on the dynamic aspects – such as for 
example pace and rhythm (cf. Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002) – of the process of firm growth 
within and across industries. Understanding the rules of successful evolution of corporate 
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portfolios might be useful in clarifying the diversification-performance relationship (cf. 
Matsusaka, 2001).  
Our understanding of corporate expansions within and across industries would also be 
enhanced by proper accounting for the context of such expansions, for example dynamism 
and uncertainty of the environment, as different steps on diversification routes may be more 
or less appropriate in different situations. Moreover, experiences from a single but turbulent 
industry may not necessarily be ‘narrow,’ in particular when compared to experiences across 
a number of stable industries that are not much different from one another. Firms may also 
occupy multiple niches within an industry (cf. Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 2005), which may 
equip them with diverse experiences as well. Furthermore, heterogeneity or homogeneity of 
industry experience is also subject to trends over time, where periods of growth may bring 
about experiences that are incomparable to those from periods of stagnation or decline. These 
and other potential sources of heterogeneity of industry experience of firms, and their 
relationship with performance and value creation, need to be further researched.  
Finally, passage of time may be an important determinant of availability and usability 
of past experience. For example, it can be expected that experiences distant in time are more 
likely to be ignored by firms than recent experiences. Our analyses of two alternative 
measures of experience across industries showed that these are both current and past 
experiences that matter for firm capabilities to create value when expanding within and across 
industries. However, whether past experiences become too remote in time and too irrelevant 
(given the current investment situation) to be relied on, and how this may change the impact 
of within- and across-industry experiences on firm value creation, remains an open question.  
 Our study is not without limitations. First, it empirically explored firms originating 
from one country, the Netherlands. Future research that either examines firms originating 
from another country, or from a number of countries, would add to the current study. Second, 
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in our empirical analyses we relied on the event study method, which some criticize on 
grounds of its underlying assumption that investors adequately evaluate the long-term implications 
of strategic decisions of firms in the short period surrounding the event. While research in the field 
of finance does support this assumption (Fama, 1998; Malkiel, 2003), and there is considerable 
evidence in prior literature that event study method has predictive validity (e.g., Healy et al., 
1992; Kale et al., 2002), future studies could test our hypotheses using alternative dependent 
variables, such as subsidiary survival or managerial evaluations of new venture performance. 
Finally, already Penrose (1995) recognized that diversification may involve departure from a 
firm’s existing activities in terms of entering new (product or geographic) markets, new 
technology areas, or both. Future research distinguishing between technology and market 
















5.1. Key findings 
 
In an era of rapid technological progress and major political and economic 
transformations across the globe, changes in geographic and product portfolios of firms 
become more of a rule than an exception. Hence, much research in a variety of theoretical 
traditions has been conducted in order to determine which strategies and entry modes firms 
choose, and how they perform as a consequence. Comparatively little attention was paid to 
how organizational experience bases are developed and used as companies expand into a 
variety of countries and industries. Prior research in this tradition suggested that strategic 
choices are path-dependent and that this path-dependence is a key factor that ties 
organizational learning to performance as firms move along their chosen expansion paths (cf. 
Bettis & Prahalad, 1995; Teece et al., 1994; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001, 2002). 
Importantly, however, the strategic choices and organizational learning do not occur in a 
vacuum. Conditions under which an investment is attempted – such as environmental 
uncertainty or the novelty of a task to be undertaken – play a major role in determining which 
past experiences of firms are relevant and which should be disregarded, as only the use of 
relevant experience can bring about positive performance outcomes (cf. Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999; Levitt & March, 1988). The three studies presented in this thesis 
contributed to prior literature by explicitly addressing the issue of what types of experience 
are particularly helpful in different investment situations.  
More specifically, building on organizational learning theory we considered three 
types of strategic decisions of firms: formations of IJVs, international expansions in general, 
and expansions within and across industries. When considering the impact of strategic 
expansions on firm value, we explicitly took into account characteristics of a given 




differ in qualitative and quantitative terms. The quantitative difference was that in equity 
stake. We argued that small stakes (minority IJVs) imply relatively low amounts of physical 
and managerial resources committed to a venture – and hence put at risk – as compared to 
large stakes (majority IJVs). At the same time, minority and majority IJVs alike allow firms 
to secure toeholds in foreign markets. This led to the prediction that the larger the 
environmental uncertainty and the more novel an investment situation is, the larger increases 
in firm value will be observed upon formations of minority IJVs as compared to majority 
IJVs. The qualitative differences between the two types of IJVs, however, implied that 
experiences with minority IJVs are not necessarily applicable when expanding by means of 
majority IJVs and vice versa. This led to predictions regarding preferences of firms to expand 
using either minority or majority IJVs, but also regarding relative differences in firm value 
creation capabilities of the two types of ventures. Extensive empirical test supported most of 
these predictions. 
In Chapter 3, we focused further on the role of organizational experience in foreign 
growth of firms. Based on theoretical arguments, two distinct attributes of international 
experience were identified: its depth (measured as the number of prior expansions of a firm in 
a host country) and breadth (measured as the number of host countries into which the firm 
ever expanded). We predicted that the generally positive role of experience depth is 
reinforced by its breadth. Additionally, the role of international experience was shown to be 
conditional on characteristics of host countries, such as political hazards, economic risk, and 
cultural factors. While past experience from particularly challenging locations appeared to be 
helpful when expanding into similarly demanding countries (with respect to cultural or 
economic factors, for instance), past experience from less challenging locations proved to 
have a liability effect in such investment situations. The empirical evidence corroborated 




Finally, Chapter 4 looked and content and applicability of organizational experience 
from the perspective of corporate expansions within and across industries. Theoretical 
reasoning led to predictions that past experiences from a given industry as well as from a 
range of industries, in particular when in combination with one another, help firms create 
value when expanding. Yet, we also found that different types of experience lend themselves 
best to different types of expansions. Firms attempting exploratory investments (such as 
acquisitions and entries into businesses unrelated to core activities of the firms) were expected 
to be particularly likely to succeed – in terms of value creation – if they had broad experiences 
from other industries. Conversely, within-industry experiences were relatively more valuable 
in cases of exploitative expansions, such as greenfield investments and entries into businesses 
closely related to core activities of firms. Empirical tests supported most of these predictions.  
Overall, research presented in this thesis reinforced the idea that organizational 
experience is multifaceted, and that different types of experience are applicable in different 
investment situations (cf. Anand & Khanna, 2000; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Levitt & 
March, 1988), as characterized by environmental conditions and features of particular 
expansion moves. Value-focused firms should best aim at developing repositories of 
experiences and routines that would not only help them to perform well in the next time 
period, but – and perhaps more importantly – ones that would not constrain their future 
learning and adaptation to new conditions (cf. Levinthal & March, 1993). This is particularly 
important in the changing world, where exploratory strategies and ‘probes’ (cf. Brown & 
Eisenhard, 1997) are often used to keep up with competition. Successful execution of such 
strategies requires both efficient routines, which can be developed thanks to deep knowledge 
of a given market, and broad knowledge bases, which lend themselves well to recombination 
(cf. Kogut & Zander, 1992), and are a good ground for absorbing incoming information (cf. 




5.2. Limitations and future research 
 
Much future research is needed to further our understanding of the mechanisms through 
which organizational experience helps or inhibits firm value creation by various means and in 
a variety of contexts. In sections 2.8, 3.7, and 4.7, we already discussed a number of 
limitations of research presented in this thesis, as well as several areas where future 
investigations may prove fruitful. In addition to those considerations, it should be stressed 
here that the view of the role of organizational experience in corporate expansions and firm 
value creation presented in this thesis is by no means complete. For example, geographic and 
product portfolios of firms are as much a result of new investments as divestments. Over time, 
firms tend to replace businesses in their portfolios with ones they consider more valuable, in 
particular if growth opportunities within their current portfolios are less attractive than those 
outside of their portfolios (cf. Chang, 1999; Penrose, 1995; Van Kranenburg et al., 2001). 
Research into patterns of exit from and entry into new product and geographic markets would 
be relevant from theoretical and practical standpoints alike. 
 Research presented in this thesis also showed that it is important to consider the 
content of organizational experience when investigating its relationship with choices, 
performance, and value of firms. While some ways of doing so have already been proposed in 
this thesis, future studies into the content of experience are warranted. For example, our 
concept of the diversity of experience across industries (Chapter 4) could be further refined to 
accommodate the idea that some industries are more heterogeneous than others. Indeed, 
experience from two mature industries is not necessarily as diverse as experience from two 
growing industries. Similarly, experience from different countries may be more 
heterogeneous than assumed in our measure of international experience breadth (Chapter 3), 




‘challenging’ ones. Finally, fine-grained analyses of entry mode experience are called for. In 
Chapter 2, we showed that experiences from minority IJVs are not necessarily applicable to 
majority IJVs and vice versa. Relatedly, Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) showed that 
experience with acquisitions is heterogeneous and subject to misapplication. It remains an 
open question how heterogeneous experiences with (wholly or partly owned) greenfield 
investments are, and what firms may learn from expansions into related industries (where key 
differences may exist between horizontal and vertical entries, for example).  
 Our understanding of the relationship between organizational performance and 
strategic decisions of firms would be further enhanced if more attention were paid to the 
context in which those firms operate and where their repositories of capabilities are 
developed. Research presented in this thesis was based on observations of the Dutch 
multinationals. An interesting question to ask would be how firms originating from less stable 
economies, such as former socialist nations or developing countries, may benefit from their 
experiences. Intuitively, we may expect that domestic experiences of firms that survived a 
transition from communist state system to market economy are more diverse than (domestic) 
experiences of their equivalents originating from developed countries. How this changes their 
strategies and performance remains an open question. Qualitatively, similar differences may 
exist between firms whose core industries are stable and mature versus those operating mainly 
in hypercompetitive environments. Within-industry experience in the former case is probably 
less heterogeneous than in the latter case. Investigating the strategy-performance relationship 
across a variety of contexts promises to be a fruitful area for future research. 
 Finally, we also do not understand how firms learn from their experiences (and 
possibly from other sources). Do the locus of experience, experience age, timing, etc., impact 
its transferability and usability? While these and other questions are beyond the scope of this 




companies may acquire the skills and routines that would prove most useful in the globalizing 
world.  
 Methodologically, research presented in this thesis relied on data from a fairly limited 
number of Dutch companies. Moreover, the core empirical analyses – those of firm value 
changes upon corporate expansion announcements – were conducted using the event study 
method. Replicating this research in other national and industrial settings, as well as using 
other measures of firm performance, for example by analyzing subsidiary survival or taking 
the approach to verifying event study method suggested in Chapter 2, would help establishing 















De belangrijkste trends in het economische landschap gedurende de laatste decennia zijn de 
snelle technologische vooruitgang, het openen en de liberalisering van nieuwe interessante 
markten (zoals China en de voormalige communistische landen) en de toenemende 
globalisatie (Hitt, Keats, & De Marie, 1998). Deze trends hebben geleid tot wat men het ‘new 
competitive landscape’ noemt (Bettis & Hitt, 1995; Hitt et al., 1998), waarin beslissingnemers 
in bedrijven geconfronteerd worden met grote strategische uitdagingen tengevolge van 
onzekerheid, ambiguïteit en complexiteit. Bedrijven reageren verschillend op deze nieuwe 
uitdagingen. Sommige bedrijven maken bijvoorbeeld gebruik van coöperatieve strategieën 
(Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997) terwijl andere gebruik maken van het benutten van wereldwijde 
markten (Mitchell, Shaver, & Yeung, 1992, 1993) of het wijzigen van hun assortiment aan 
producten (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995; Delios & Beamish, 1999; Markides & Williamson, 
1996).   
Het succesvolle gebruik van zulke strategieën en het overleven van bedrijven op de 
lange termijn in een competitieve en globale wereld maakt het noodzakelijk dat bedrijven de 
nodige vaardigheden en kennis bezitten. Ondanks dat leren van ervaringen een van de 
belangrijkste manieren is om een waardevol repertoire van routines en kennis op te bouwen 
(Cyert & March, 1963; Levitt & March, 1988; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Penrose, 1995), is het 
eerdere onderzoek dat kijkt naar wat bedrijven kunnen leren van verschillende soorten 
ervaringen en naar wat hen helpt om deze verwoven kennis succesvol toe te passen in 
verschillende investeringssituaties (cf. Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999) erg beperkt. Het kan 
geargumenteerd worden dat bedrijven die succesvol zijn in een bepaald type omgeving, zoals 
een bepaalde industrie, land, cultuur, enz., niet noodzakelijk succesvol zijn met deze zelfde 
strategie en routines in een ander soort omgeving. De drie studies in dit proefschrift leveren 
een bijdrage tot de voorafgaande literatuur door expliciet het probleem te adresseren welke 




In het bijzonder kijken we naar de waarde implicaties van drie soorten strategische 
beslissingen aan de hand van ‘organizational learning theory’ (e.g., Barkema & Vermeulen, 
1998; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Levitt & March, 1988; March, 1991; 
Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). Deze drie strategieën zijn de vorming van internationale joint 
ventures (IJVs), internationale expansies in het algemeen en expansies in eenzelfde of andere 
industrieën. Bij het bestuderen van deze investeringen hebben we expliciet de kenmerken van 
de investeringssituatie in beschouwing genomen.   
We begonnen bij de observatie dat wanneer expansies naar nieuwe en onzekere 
omgevingen plaatsvinden, succesvolle bedrijven vaak kiezen voor strategische allianties, 
omdat dit soort investeringen in het bijzonder geschikt zijn voor projecten met een onzekere 
uitkomst (cf. Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Mjoen & Tallman, 1997; Steensma & Lyles, 2000). 
Bouwend op dit idee, maken we in Hoofdstuk 2 een onderscheid tussen minderheids IJVs en 
meerderheids IJVs. Daarenboven argumenteren we dat beide zowel kwalitatief en kwantitatief 
verschillen van elkaar. We opperen dat een klein aandeel in een IJV (minderheids IJVs) 
neerkomt op een klein engagement van fysieke en leidinggevende middelen tot de IJV, 
hetgeen resulteert in een lager risico in vergelijking tot het nemen van een groter aandeel 
(meerderheids IJVs). Desalniettemin is het met beide soorten IJV mogelijk om toegang te 
krijgen tot buitenlandse markten. Als gevolg hiervan voorspelden we dat hoe groter de 
onzekerheid in de algemene omgeving en hoe nieuwer de situatie omtrent een investering is, 
des te groter de toename in waarde is van het bedrijf als het kiest voor een minderheids IJV in 
tegenstelling tot een meerderheids IJV. De kwalitatieve verschillen tussen beide types van 
IJVs hebben als gevolg dat ervaringen met een van de twee types niet noodzakelijk 
overdraagbaar zijn naar het andere type IJV. We verwachtten dat het misplaatst gebruik van 
voorbije ervaringen een negatief effect zou hebben op de waarde van het bedrijf. Daarom is 




De geobserveerde selectieve, in plaats van  universele, toepassing van verschillende 
elementen van ervaringen in verschillende investeringssituaties heeft tot gevolg dat het 
verband tussen ervaringen en de prestaties van het bedrijf veel complexer is dan tot op heden 
werd verondersteld in de literatuur (e.g., Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Eriksson, 
Johanson, Majkgård, & Sharma; 2000; Li, 1995). Daarom zijn we in Hoofdstuk 3 dieper 
ingegaan op de inhoud van internationale ervaringen van bedrijven (cf. Levitt & March, 1988) 
en hebben we theorie en hypotheses ontwikkeld om aan te tonen hoe twee verschillende 
soorten internationale ervaringen – breedte en diepte ervaringen – de creatie van waarde als 
gevolg van buitenlandse expansies beïnvloeden (cf. Luo & Peng, 1999). Een sleutelgedachte 
in deze studie is dat vorige ervaringen en de daaruit volgende routines in het bedrijf mogelijk 
ontoereikend zijn om succesvol een gegeven markt te betreden (Levitt & March, 1988). Deze 
ontoereikendheid kan dan op zijn beurt leiden tot negatieve prestaties (Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999). We stelden voor dat diversiteit in ervaringen een bedrijf beschermt tegen 
de mogelijkheid van negatieve bedrijfsresultaten. Verder constateren we ook dat de politieke, 
culturele en macro-economische context waarin ervaringen hebben plaatsgevonden en waarin 
deze ervaringen mogelijk worden hergebruikt, invloed hebben op de capaciteiten van het 
bedrijf om waarde te creëren met nieuwe buitenlandse expansies (cf. Delios & Henisz, 2003).  
In Hoofdstuk 4 hebben we de analyse van de inhoud en de gepastheid van de 
ervaringen van bedrijven uitgebreid door naar de context van bedrijfsexpansies in eenzelfde 
en in verschillende industrieën te kijken. In tegenstelling tot de meerderheid van de studies in 
deze stroom van onderzoek (cf. Montgomery, 1994; Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 2000), kijken 
wij vanuit een dynamisch perspectief naar de stappen die bedrijven nemen op hun 
diversificatieroute en naar de soorten ervaringen die hen helpen de grootste waarde te creëren. 
We verkennen het idee dat zowel vroegere ervaringen in een gegeven industrie als in een 




We hypothetiseren ook dat bedrijfsexpansies die exploiterend van karakter zijn, zoals 
greenfield investeringen of expansies naar markten die nauw gerelateerd zijn aan de 
kernactiviteiten van het bedrijf, relatief meer waardevol zijn als de ervaring in eenzelfde 
industrie toeneemt. Anderzijds zijn ervaringen met een spectrum van industrieën vooral 
waardevol voor bedrijven die expansies doen die meer exploratief zijn zoals expansies in 
ongerelateerde industrieën of acquisities.  
De theoretische voorspellingen die voortkomen uit Hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4 zijn 
getoetst op samples van nieuwe expansies gemaakt door vijfentwintig Nederlandse 
multinationals gedurende de periodes 1973-1998 (Hoofdstuk 2 en 4) en 1982-1998 
(Hoofdstuk 3). Deze samples zijn gebaseerd op informatie die verstrekt is in de jaarverslagen 
van deze bedrijven, in persberichten in Het Financieele Dagblad, en op de gegevens van de 
Amsterdamse beurs die beschikbaar zijn van Datastream Advance database van ThomsonTM 
Financial. In overeenstemming met de theorie in dit proefschrift, wordt de afhankelijke 
variabele die hoofdzakelijk gebruikt wordt voor het toetsen van de hypothese dat het bedrijf 
waarde heeft gecreëerd door middel van een nieuwe expansie, gemeten als de abnormale 
verandering in de prijs van het aandeel van het bedrijf als gevolg van de persmededeling van 
de nieuwe expansie zoals dit gedaan wordt met de ‘event study’ methode. Verder is er gebruik 
gemaakt van zogenaamde ‘multinomial regression’ technieken om de hypotheses direct te 
toetsen. Bovendien introduceren we in Hoofdstuk 2 een nieuwe benaderingswijze om de 
‘event study’ methode te valideren, waarin analyses van de strategische en 
omgevingsdeterminanten van de abnormale opbrengsten gecombineerd worden met de 
analyses van keuzes van de leidinggevenden en hun impact op het bedrijfsresultaat doorheen 
lange periodes.  
In het algemeen versterkt dit onderzoek het idee dat de ervaringen van een bedrijf 




verschillende investeringssituaties die op hun beurt gekenmerkt worden door de 
omstandigheden in de omgeving en de kenmerken van een specifieke expansie (cf. Anand & 
Khanna, 2000; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Levitt & March, 1988). Bedrijven die zich 
toeleggen op het creëren van waarde zouden zich het best kunnen richten op het ontwikkelen 
van een breed assortiment van ervaringen en routines die het bedrijf niet enkel in staat stellen 
om beter te presteren in de volgende periode maar vooral het bedrijf geen beperkingen oplegt 
die het toekomstige leren en aanpassen aan nieuwe omstandigheden onmogelijk of moeilijker 
maakt. Dit is vooral belangrijk in een veranderlijke wereld, waar exploratieve strategieën vaak 
gebruikt worden om bij te blijven met concurrenten. De succesvolle uitvoering van zulke 
strategieën vereist zowel efficiënte routines, die ontwikkeld kunnen worden als gevolg van 
een grondige kennis van een gegeven markt, en een brede kennisbasis die makkelijk 
gerecombineerd kan worden (Kogut & Zander, 1992) en die tevens fungeert als een goede 
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